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Abstract
The SecureMDD project provides a software engineering approach to develop secure smart card
applications. The approach is model-driven and integrates formal verification to guarantee the se-
curity of the application under development. Furthermore, based on a platform-independent UML
model of the application under development, the approach is able to generate executable source
code for the smart cards and terminals of the application. The whole approach is fully supported
by tools and all model-to-model- as well as model-to-text-transformations are fully implemented.
This paper contains the implementation of the transformations that generate a formal specification
out of the platform-independent UML model of an application. The formal specification is based
on algebraic specifications and Abstract State Machines (ASM). The formal model can be loaded
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The SecureMDD approach supports the development of applications that use web services, smart
cards and terminals. Terminals are devices that consist of at least one smart card reader and can
communicate with a smart card. Moreover a terminal usually has a user interface to communicate
with the user of the application and can also call service operations. For example, a terminal could
be a Home-PC or an automat.
In this Section we shortly summarize the approach. It has been described in more detail in [5].
Fig. 1.1 contains an overview.
Figure 1.1: Overview of the SecureMDD approach
The development of an application starts with the creation of a platform-independent UML
model. This is an abstract view of a system, omitting implementation details. To be able to
model security-critical applications, UML was tailored to this domain by defining a UML profile.
To support the modeling of the dynamic part of an application, i.e. the communication as well
as the processing of messages, we defined a domain-specific language called Model Extension
Language (MEL) which is used in UML activity diagrams. With this language it is possible to
make assignments to the attributes of component classes, to create objects or to call predefined
cryptographic operations. The platform-independent UML model of an application consists of all
information that are needed to generate executable code as well as a formal model of the whole
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application automatically.
The platform-independent model is used to generate three platform-specific models (PSM),
one for the modeled smart card components, one for the terminals and one for the modeled
services. The platform-specific models contain technical information about the implementation.
Their aim is to minimize the gap between the platform-independent model and the generated
code. For example, the Smart Card PSM contains classes with operations for the serialization and
deserialization of messages. Since the communication with smart cards in the implementation is
based on byte arrays (called APDUs [3]), these operations are used to transform a message into a
byte array before sending it.
The platform-specific model is transformed into code using model-to-model and model-to-
-text transformations. For terminals and web services we generate Java code. Smart cards are
programmed with Java Card ([3]), which is a subset of Java and is tailored for the use on resource-
constraint devices. Thus, for smart cards we generate Java Card code.
The modeled application and especially the cryptographic protocols may contain functional
and security errors. We integrated model-based testing into the approach that allows to design a
test case with UML and generate test cases automatically from this model (see [4]). Then, these
test cases can be executed on the generated code. Currently, tests to find protocol logic flaws as
well as security tests are supported. To test the security, possible attacks are modeled with UML.
The generated test cases check if these attacks are executable on the generated code.
To guarantee the security of an application, the approach integrates the formal verification
of application-specific security properties (see [6]). Application-specific properties are e.g. that
an electronic prescription that is stored on an electronic health card cannot be filled twice in a
pharmacy. Other properties are that only genuine prescriptions can be filled, i.e. only a doctor
is able to issue a prescription, and that the attacker does not get to know any prescriptions. In
our opinion, for many applications application-specific security properties give better guarantees
to the security of an application than standard properties like secrecy, integrity or authenticity.
However, standard properties are often prerequisites for proving application-specific properties and
thus, have to be verified as well. Our approach generates a formal specification based on algebraic
specifications and abstract state machines (ASM) [2] for the modeled application. The generated
formal model is loaded into the theorem prover KIV [1] and used for interactive verification of
application-specific security properties.
The security properties that are proved to hold on the formal model also have to hold on code
level. To guarantee this, the generated code has to be a refinement of the generated formal model.
A solution that proves the refinement for any application that is developed with the SecureMDD
approach is work in progress. A first result is the definition of a calculus for QVT (the language
used to implement the model-to-model transformations) in KIV. This calculus can be used to
prove the correctness of QVT transformations (see [7]).
The SecureMDD approach is fully supported by tools. For creation of the platform-independent
UML model we make use of the UML modeling tool Magic Draw1. The transformations of the
UML model into code as well as into the formal specification are executable using Eclipse plugins.
The model-to-model transformations are implemented in Operational QVT2. The model-to-text
transformations are implemented in Xpand3. As development environment as well as to execute
the transformations we use the Eclipse Modeling Project4. The parsing and annotation of the
MEL expressions is implemented in Java.
This paper contains the implementation of the model-to-text-transformations that generate a
formal specification for smart card and terminal applications out of the platform-independent UML
model. The generation of a formal model for web services is not supported yet. The following
chapters show the model-transformations that generate the formal specification from the UML







Generation of a formal
specification
The following graphics shows a generated formal specification. Orange nodes and clipped nodes
are library nodes that are imported into this project. Blue nodes show specifications that are




Transformations for the ASM
IMPORT uml
EXTENSION templates : : parse
EXTENSION templates : : g e t t e r
EXTENSION templates : : deployment
DEFINE Root FOR uml : : Model
 t h i s . setContext ( )
EXPAND generateASM FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateASMAUX FOR t h i s
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateASMAUX FOR Model
FILE ”ASMAUX/ s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”
enr i ch USER, a l l I n s t a n c e s , ConnectDisconnect
, ManualFuns , a c c e s s f u n s
IF t h i s
. ex i s t sFakeCard l e t ( ) , FakeCardletSimple
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . c ons tant sEx i s t ()− , cons tant s
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . s t a t u s E x i s t s ()− , Status
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesSymmKey ( ) , generateKey
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . ex i s t sNonce ( ) , generateNonce
ENDIF−
FOREACH t h i s . g e t L i s t A s s o c i a t i o n s ( )




end enr i ch
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateASM FOR Model
FILE ”ASM/ s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−




EXPAND generateSTEPRule FOR th i s−
act iv i t i e s2ASM ( )
end asm s p e c i f i c a t i o n
ENDFILE−
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateSTEPRule FOR uml : : Model
asm r u l e STEP
d e c l a r a t i o n
STEP : STEP
{
l e t asm−s tep = [ ? ] , exc ep t i on occu r r ed = f a l s e
in
{
i f asm−s tep = connect then
{ CONNECT( ; connect ions , inputs ) }
e l s e i f asm−s tep = d i s connec t then
{ DISCONNECT( ; connect ions , inputs ) }
e l s e i f asm−s tep = attacker−agent−s tep then
{ ATTACKER( connect ions , at tacker−known ; inputs ) }
e l s e i f asm−s tep = user−agent−s tep then
{ choose ag with ( i s u s e r ( ag )
convertSymbol (” and ”) exagent
( ag ) ) in USER
( ag , connec t i ons ; at tacker−known , inputs
) i f none sk ip }
FOREACH t h i s . getAl lSmartcards ( ) AS s c c l a s s−
e l s e i f asm−s tep =
 s c c l a s s . name−agent−s tep then
{ choose ag with ( i s  s c c l a s s . name( ag )
convertSymbol (” and ”) exagent
( ag ) ) in
 s c c l a s s . name
. toUpperCase ( )STEP i fnone sk ip }
ENDFOREACH−
FOREACH t h i s . ge tAl lTermina l s ( )
AS t e r m i n a l c l a s s−
e l s e i f asm−s tep =
 t e r m i n a l c l a s s . name−agent−s tep then
{ choose ag with ( i s
 t e r m i n a l c l a s s . name( ag )
convertSymbol (” and ”) exagent
( ag ) ) in
 t e r m i n a l c l a s s . name
. toUpperCase ( )STEP i fnone sk ip }
ENDFOREACH−
FOREACH t h i s . g e t A l l S e r v i c e s ( )
AS s e r v i c e c l a s s −
e l s e i f asm−s tep =
 s e r v i c e c l a s s . name−agent−s tep then
{ choose ag with ( i s
 s e r v i c e c l a s s . name( ag )
convertSymbol (” and ”) exagent
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( ag ) ) in
 s e r v i c e c l a s s . name
. toUpperCase ( )STEP i fnone sk ip }
ENDFOREACH−
IF t h i s . ex i s t sFakeCard l e t ()−
e l s e i f asm−s tep = fo rgeab l e−ca rd l e t−agent−s tep then
{ choose ag with ( i s f a k e c a r d l e t
( ag ) ) in SIMPLE−FAKE−CARDLET
( ag , connec t i ons ; fake−ca rd l e t−known , inputs
) i f none sk ip }
ENDIF−
} ;





Transformations for agents and
messages
IMPORT uml
EXTENSION templates : : g e t t e r
EXTENSION templates : : a t t a cke r
EXTENSION templates : : deployment
DEFINE Root FOR uml : : Model
EXPAND generateFromClassDiagram
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateFromClassDiagram FOR Model
EXPAND generateAgent FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateAgentPreds FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateAgentL i s t FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateData FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateDatatypesL i s t FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateP la inDataL i s t FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateHashDataList FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateS ignDataLi s t FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateMessages FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateMessage funs FOR t h i s
EXPAND g e n e r a t e M e s s a g e l i s t FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateConstants FOR t h i s
EXPAND genera teSta tus FOR t h i s
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateAgent FOR Model
FILE ” agent / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
us ing int−pa i r
agent =
FOREACH t h i s . ge tAl lTermina l s ( )
AS t e r m i n a l c l a s s−
 t e r m i n a l c l a s s . name( .
. name : nat ) with i s  t e r m i n a l c l a s s . name |
ENDFOREACH−
FOREACH t h i s . getAl lSmartcards ( ) AS ca rdc l a s s−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 c a r d c l a s s . name( . . name : nat ) with i s
 c a r d c l a s s . name |
ENDFOREACH−
FOREACH t h i s . g e t A l l S e r v i c e s ( )
AS s e r v i c e c l a s s −
 s e r v i c e c l a s s . name( .
. name : nat ) with i s  s e r v i c e c l a s s . name |
ENDFOREACH−
IF t h i s . ex i s t sFakeCard l e t ()−
fake−c a r d l e t ( . . name : nat ) with i s f a k e c a r d l e t |
ENDIF−
user ( . . name : nat ) with i s u s e r |
a t tacke r with i s a t t a c k e r ;
v a r i a b l e s ag , ag0 , ag1 : agent ;
end data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateAgentPreds FOR Model
FILE ” agentPreds / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
enr i ch agent with
p r e d i c a t e s
i s s t a t e f u l S e r v i c e : agent ;
axioms
LET t h i s . g e t A l l S e r v i c e s ( ) . s e l e c t ( e | e
. i s S t a t e f u l ( ) ) AS s t a t e f u l c l a s s e s −
IF s t a t e f u l c l a s s e s . isEmpty−
i s s t a t e f u l S e r v i c e : not i s s t a t e f u l S e r v i c e
( ag ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ELSE−
i s s t a t e f u l S e r v i c e : i s s t a t e f u l S e r v i c e ( ag ) <−>
(
FOREACH s t a t e f u l c l a s s e s
AS s e r v i c e c l a s s SEPARATOR convertSymbol (” or”)−





end enr i ch
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateData FOR Model
FILE ” data / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
LET t h i s . getNormalClasses ( ) AS d a ta c l a s s e s−
LET d a t a c l a s s e s . isEmpty AS noData
IF noDataenr i ch
ELSEdata s p e c i f i c a t i o n
us ing
ENDIF
bool , int−pair , s t r i ng−data , byte
IF t h i s . e x i s t s S e c r e t ( ) | | t h i s
. usesSymmKey ( ) , S e c r e tENDIF−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IF t h i s . ex i s t sNonce ( ) | | t h i s
. usesSymmKey ( ) , NonceENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesSymmKey ( ) | | t h i s . uses
ASymmKey( ) , KeyENDIF−
IF ! noData
FOREACH d a t a c l a s s e s AS c−
c . name = mkc . name
c . getArguments ( ) ;
ENDFOREACH
IF ! d a t a c l a s s e s . isEmpty
data =
FOREACH d a t a c l a s s e s AS c SEPARATOR ” | ”−
c .WRAP2(” data”)− ( . .
c . name . toFirstLower ()− :
c . name−) with i sc . name
ENDFOREACH− ;
ENDIF−
LET t h i s . g e t P l a i n C l a s s e s ( ) AS p l a i n c l a s s e s−
IF ! p l a i n c l a s s e s . isEmpty−
PlainData =
FOREACH p l a i n c l a s s e s AS c SEPARATOR ” | ”−
c .WRAP2(” PlainData”)− ( . .
c . name . toFirstLower ()− :





LET t h i s . getHashClasses ( ) AS h a s h c l a s s e s
IF ! h a s h c l a s s e s . isEmpty−
HashData =
FOREACH h a s h c l a s s e s AS c SEPARATOR ” | ”−
c .WRAP2(” HashData”)− ( . .
c . name . toFirstLower ()− :





LET t h i s . g e tS i gnC la s s e s ( ) AS s i g n c l a s s e s−
IF ! s i g n c l a s s e s . isEmpty−
SignData =
FOREACH s i g n c l a s s e s AS c SEPARATOR ” |”−
c .WRAP2(” SignData”)− ( . .
c . name . toFirstLower ()− :





IF t h i s . usesEncrypt ion ()−
EncData = mkEncData( . . key : SymmKey; .
. p l a i n : PlainData ) ;
ENDIF−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IF t h i s . usesAsymmEncryption()−
EncDataAsymm = mkEncDataAsymm( . . key : PublicKey ; .
. p l a i n : PlainData ) ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesHashing ()−
HashedData = mkHashedData ( . . hash : HashData ) ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . u s e sS i gn ing ()−
SignedData = mkSignedData ( . . key : PrivateKey ; .
. s i gndata : SignData ) ;
ENDIF−
v a r i a b l e s
IF ! d a t a c l a s s e s . isEmpty−
varname (” data ”) ,
varname (” data ”)0 ,
varname (” data ”)1 : data ;
ENDIF−
IF ! t h i s . g e t P l a i n C l a s s e s ( ) . isEmpty−
varname (” PlainData ”) ,
varname (” PlainData ”)0 ,
varname (” PlainData ”)1 : PlainData ;
ENDIF−
IF ! t h i s . getHashClasses ( ) . isEmpty−
varname (” HashData ”) ,
varname (” HashData ”)0 ,
varname (” HashData ”)1 : HashData ;
ENDIF−
IF ! t h i s . g e tS i gnC la s s e s ( ) . isEmpty−
varname (” SignData ”) ,
varname (” SignData ”)0 ,
varname (” SignData ”)1 : SignData ;
ENDIF−
( : v a r i a b l e s f o r data , p la in , hash , s i gn c l a s s e s : )
FOREACH t h i s . getNormalClasses ( ) AS c−
c . varname ( ) , c . varname ( )0 ,
c . varname ( )1 : c . name ;
ENDFOREACH−
IF t h i s . usesEncrypt ion ()−
varname (” EncData ”) ,
varname (” EncData ”)0 ,
varname (” EncData ”)1 : EncData ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesAsymmEncryption()−
varname (”EncDataAsymm”) ,
varname (”EncDataAsymm”)0 ,
varname (”EncDataAsymm”)1 : EncDataAsymm ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesHashing ()−
varname (” HashedData ”) ,
varname (” HashedData ”)0 ,
varname (” HashedData ”)1 : HashedData ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . u s e sS i gn ing ()−
varname (” SignedData ”) ,
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varname (” SignedData ”)0 ,
varname (” SignedData ”)1 : SignedData ;
ENDIF−
end data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
ELSE
with




DEFINE generateMessages FOR Model
FILE ”message/ s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
LET t h i s . getAllMessageAndUserMessageClasses ( )
AS msgs
us ing Secur i tyOperat ions
message =
FOREACH msgs AS c SEPARATOR ” | ”− mk
c . name
c . getArguments ( ) with i s
c . name
ENDFOREACH− ;
v a r i a b l e s
msg , msg0 , msg1 : message ;
ENDLET−
end data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateMessage funs FOR Model
FILE ” messagefuns / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”
enr i ch message with
p r e d i c a t e s
i s u s e r m e s s a g e : message ;
i s v a l i d c a r d m e s s a g e : message ;
comment : t rue i f not a user message
and a l l numbers f i t i n to a shor t va lue ;
IF ! t h i s . g e t P l a i n C l a s s e s ( ) . isEmpty−
i s v a l i d c a r d P l a i n D a t a : PlainData ; comment
: t rue i f a l l numbers f i t i n to a shor t va lue . ;
ENDIF−
. \ in . : i n t , message ;
comment : t rue i f i occurs as a c l e a r t ex t number
anywhere in the message . I . e i s r e cu r s i v e ,
but does i gnore encrypted / s igned /hashed s t u f f ;
IF ! t h i s . g e t P l a i n C l a s s e s ( ) . isEmpty−
. \ in . : int , PlainData ;
ENDIF−
FOREACH t h i s . getNormalClasses ( ) AS c−





i s v a l i d c a r d m e s s a g e−de f :
i s v a l i d c a r d m e s s a g e (msg) <−> not i s u s e r m e s s a g e
(msg) and a l l i . i \ in msg −> i \ i n s h o r t ;
FOREACH t h i s . ge tAl lMessageClas se s ( ) AS c−
c . generateIntInAxiom ()−
ENDFOREACH−
FOREACH t h i s . getNormalClasses ( ) AS c−
c . generateIntInAxiom ()−
ENDFOREACH−
LET t h i s . g e t P l a i n C l a s s e s ( ) AS p l a i n c l a s s e s−
IF ! p l a i n c l a s s e s . isEmpty
i s v a l i d c a r d P l a i n D a t a−de f :
i s v a l i d c a r d P l a i n D a t a ( a PlainData ) <−> a l l i
. i \ in a PlainData −> i \ i n s h o r t ;
ENDIF
FOREACH p l a i n c l a s s e s AS c−
c . generatePlainDataIntInAxiom ()−
ENDFOREACH−
ENDLET
i s u s e r mes sage−de f : i s u s e r m e s s a g e (msg)
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
LET t h i s . getAl lUserMessageClasses ( ) AS umsgs−
FOREACH umsgs
AS umsg SEPARATOR convertSymbol (” or”)−
i sumsg . name(msg)
ENDFOREACHENDLET ;
end enr i ch
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateConstants FOR Model
FILE ” cons tant s / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
enr i ch int−pa i r with
LET t h i s . ge tAl lConstants ( ) AS c l a s s e s−
IF c l a s s e s . s i z e > 0
cons tant s
FOREACH c l a s s e s AS c−
FOREACH c . g e t A l l A t t r i b u t e s ( ) AS att−
IF at t . type != nul l−
at t . name : at t . t rans lateType ( ) ;
ELSE−





FOREACH c l a s s e s AS c−
FOREACH c . g e t A l l A t t r i b u t e s ( ) AS att−
IF at t . de fau l tVa lue != nul l−
at t . name : at t . name =
14
at t . de fau l tVa lue . s t r ingVa lue ()− ;
ELSE−
at t . name : at t . name =




 c l a s s e s . generateConstantsDi f fAxioms ( )
ENDIF
ENDLET−
end enr i ch
ENDFILE−
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE genera teSta tus FOR Model
FILE ” Status / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
FOREACH t h i s . getClassDiagramEnumerations ( )
AS s t a t u s c l a s s−
LET s t a t u s c l a s s . name AS classname−
classname =
FOREACH s t a t u s c l a s s . ownedLitera l




v a r i a b l e s
FOREACH t h i s . getClassDiagramEnumerations ( )
AS s t a t u s c l a s s−
 s t a t u s c l a s s . varname ( ) :
 s t a t u s c l a s s . name− ;
ENDFOREACH−
end data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
ENDFILE−
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE g e n e r a t e M e s s a g e l i s t FOR Model
FILE ” m e s s a g e l i s t / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
a c t u a l i z e l i s t −perm with messagefuns
by morphism
elem convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) message ;
l i s t convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t ;
a convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) msg ; a0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) msg0 ; b
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) msg1 ; c
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) msg2 ;
x convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) msgs ; x0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) msgs0 ; y
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) msgs1 ; z
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) msgs2 ; y0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) msgs3 ;
z0 convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) msgs4 ; x1
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) msgs5 ; y1
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convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) msgs6 ; z1
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) msgs7 ; x2
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) msgs8 ;
y2 convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) msgs9 ; z2
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) msgs10 ;
end a c t u a l i z e
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateDatatypesL i s t FOR Model
IF ! t h i s . getNormalClasses ( ) . isEmpty−
FOREACH t h i s . getNormalClasses ( )
. c a l c L i s t A c t u a l i z a t i o n s ( ) AS l i s t −
FILE l i s t . type . name + ” l i s t / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
a c t u a l i z e l i s t −perm with  l i s t . type . name
by morphism
elem convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i s t . type . name ; l i s t
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i s t . type . names ;
a convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) a
 l i s t . type . name ; a0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) a0
 l i s t . type . name ; b
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) b
 l i s t . type . name ; c
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) c
 l i s t . type . name ;
x convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) x
 l i s t . type . names ; x0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) x0
 l i s t . type . names ; y
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) y
 l i s t . type . names ; z
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z
 l i s t . type . names ; y0
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) y0
 l i s t . type . names ;
z0 convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z0
 l i s t . type . names ; x1
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) x1
 l i s t . type . names ; y1
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) y1
 l i s t . type . names ; z1
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z1
 l i s t . type . names ; x2
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) x2
 l i s t . type . names ;
y2 convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) y2
 l i s t . type . names ; z2
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z2
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 l i s t . type . names ;





DEFINE generateP la inDataL i s t FOR Model
IF ! t h i s . g e t P l a i n C l a s s e s ( ) . isEmpty
FOREACH t h i s . g e t P l a i n C l a s s e s ( )
. c a l c L i s t A c t u a l i z a t i o n s ( ) AS l i s t −
FILE l i s t . type . name + ” l i s t / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
a c t u a l i z e l i s t −perm with  l i s t . type . name
by morphism
elem convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i s t . type . name ; l i s t
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i s t . type . names ;
a convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) a
 l i s t . type . name ; a0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) a0
 l i s t . type . name ; b
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) b
 l i s t . type . name ; c
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) c
 l i s t . type . name ;
x convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) x
 l i s t . type . names ; x0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) x0
 l i s t . type . names ; y
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) y
 l i s t . type . names ; z
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z
 l i s t . type . names ; y0
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) y0
 l i s t . type . names ;
z0 convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z0
 l i s t . type . names ; x1
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) x1
 l i s t . type . names ; y1
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) y1
 l i s t . type . names ; z1
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z1
 l i s t . type . names ; x2
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) x2
 l i s t . type . names ;
y2 convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) y2
 l i s t . type . names ; z2
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z2
 l i s t . type . names ;






DEFINE generateHashDataList FOR Model
IF ! t h i s . getHashClasses ( ) . isEmpty
FOREACH t h i s . getHashClasses ( )
. c a l c L i s t A c t u a l i z a t i o n s ( ) AS l i s t −
FILE l i s t . type . name + ” l i s t / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
a c t u a l i z e l i s t −perm with  l i s t . type . name
by morphism
elem convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i s t . type . name ; l i s t
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i s t . type . names ;
a convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) a
 l i s t . type . name ; a0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) a0
 l i s t . type . name ; b
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) b
 l i s t . type . name ; c
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) c
 l i s t . type . name ;
x convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) x
 l i s t . type . names ; x0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) x0
 l i s t . type . names ; y
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) y
 l i s t . type . names ; z
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z
 l i s t . type . names ; y0
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) y0
 l i s t . type . names ;
z0 convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z0
 l i s t . type . names ; x1
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) x1
 l i s t . type . names ; y1
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) y1
 l i s t . type . names ; z1
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z1
 l i s t . type . names ; x2
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) x2
 l i s t . type . names ;
y2 convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) y2
 l i s t . type . names ; z2
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z2
 l i s t . type . names ;






DEFINE generateS ignDataLi s t FOR Model
IF ! t h i s . g e tS i gnC la s s e s ( ) . isEmpty
FOREACH t h i s . g e tS i gnC la s s e s ( )
. c a l c L i s t A c t u a l i z a t i o n s ( ) AS l i s t −
FILE l i s t . type . name + ” l i s t / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
a c t u a l i z e l i s t −perm with  l i s t . type . name
by morphism
elem convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i s t . type . name ; l i s t
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i s t . type . names ;
a convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) a
 l i s t . type . name ; a0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) a0
 l i s t . type . name ; b
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) b
 l i s t . type . name ; c
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) c
 l i s t . type . name ;
x convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) x
 l i s t . type . names ; x0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) x0
 l i s t . type . names ; y
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) y
 l i s t . type . names ; z
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z
 l i s t . type . names ; y0
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) y0
 l i s t . type . names ;
z0 convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z0
 l i s t . type . names ; x1
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) x1
 l i s t . type . names ; y1
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) y1
 l i s t . type . names ; z1
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z1
 l i s t . type . names ; x2
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) x2
 l i s t . type . names ;
y2 convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) y2
 l i s t . type . names ; z2
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) z2
 l i s t . type . names ;





DEFINE generateAgentL i s t FOR Model
FILE ” agents / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−




convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) agent ; l i s t
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) agents ;
a convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) ag ; a0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) ag0 ; b
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) ag1 ; c
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) ag2 ;
x convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) agents ; x0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) agents0 ; y
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) agents1 ; z
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) agents2 ; y0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) agents3 ;
z0 convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) agents4 ; x1
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) agents5 ; y1
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) agents6 ; z1
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) agents7 ; x2
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) agents8 ;
y2 convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) agents9 ; z2
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) agents10 ;





Transformations for the attacker
knowledge
import uml ;
extension templates : : g e t t e r ;
extension templates : : deployment ;
extension templates : : parse ;
S t r ing ca lcAttackerReadToStr ings ( Model mo) :
l et p = mo. getDeploymentDiagram ( ) :
l et ps = p . getPathsWithRead ( ) :
( ps . isEmpty
? ” not eavesdrop ( conn )” : ” eavesdrop ( conn )
<−> ” + ps . gene ra teThreatSt r ings ( ) ) ;
S t r ing ca lcAttackerSendToStr ings ( Model mo) :
l et p = mo. getDeploymentDiagram ( ) :
l et ps = p . getPathsWithSend ( ) :
( ps . isEmpty ? ” not send ( conn )” : ” send ( conn )
<−> ” + ps . gene ra teThreatSt r ings ( ) ) ;
S t r ing ca l cAttackerSuppres sToStr ings ( Model mo) :
l et p = mo. getDeploymentDiagram ( ) :
l et ps = p . getPathsWithSuppress ( ) :
( ps . isEmpty
? ” not suppres s ( conn )” : ” suppres s ( conn )
<−> ” + ps . gene ra teThreatSt r ings ( ) ) ;
S t r ing concat ( L i s t [ S t r ing ] l s t r i n g ) :
( l s t r i n g . isEmpty )
? ( ” ” ) : ( l s t r i n g . f i r s t ( ) + l s t r i n g . w i thoutF i r s t
( ) . concat ( ) ) ;
L i s t [ CommunicationPath ] getPathsWithRead ( Package p) :
(p . packagedElement . t y p e S e l e c t
( CommunicationPath ) . s e l e c t ( e | e . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : Threat ”) &&
e . getValue ( ( e . ge tAppl i edStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : Threat ” ) ) , ” read ”) == true &&
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! e . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : TransportLayerSecur i ty ” ) ) ) ;
L i s t [ CommunicationPath ] getPathsWithSend ( Package p) :
(p . packagedElement . t y p e S e l e c t
( CommunicationPath ) . s e l e c t ( e | e . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : Threat ”) &&
e . getValue ( ( e . ge tAppl i edStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : Threat ” ) ) , ” send ”) == true &&
! e . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : TransportLayerSecur i ty ” ) ) ) ;
L i s t [ CommunicationPath ] getPathsWithSuppress
( Package p) :
(p . packagedElement . t y p e S e l e c t
( CommunicationPath ) . s e l e c t ( e | e . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : Threat ”) &&
e . getValue ( ( e . ge tAppl i edStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : Threat ” ) ) , ” suppres s ”) == true &&
! e . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : TransportLayerSecur i ty ” ) ) ) ;
S t r ing gene ra teThreatSt r ings
( L i s t [ CommunicationPath ] l cp ) :
l et s t r s = lcp . c o l l e c t ( e | e . generateThreatSt r ing ( ) ) :
ppList ( s t r s , ” or ” ) ;
S t r ing generateThreatSt r ing ( CommunicationPath cp ) :
l et p1 = cp . memberEnd . f i r s t ( ) :
l et p2 = cp . memberEnd . get (1 ) :
i f ( p1 . i sNav igab l e ( ) && p2 . i sNav igab l e ( ) ) then
”( conn . endpoint1 . port = ” + p1 . portName
( ) + ” ” + convertSymbol
(” and ”) + ” conn . endpoint2 . port = ” + p2
. portName ( ) + ”)”
+ convertSymbol (” or ”) +
”( conn . endpoint1 . port = ” + p2 . portName
( ) + ” ” + convertSymbol
(” and ”) + ” conn . endpoint2 . port = ” + p1
. portName ( ) + ”)”
else i f ( p1 . i sNav igab l e ( ) && ! p2 . i sNav igab l e ( ) ) then
”( conn . endpoint1 . port = ” + p1 . portName
( ) + ” ” + convertSymbol
(” and ”) + ” conn . endpoint2 . port = ” + p2
. portName ( ) + ”)”
else i f ( ! p1 . i sNav igab l e ( ) && p2 . i sNav igab l e ( ) ) then
”( conn . endpoint1 . port = ” + p2 . portName
( ) + ” ” + convertSymbol
(” and ”) + ” conn . endpoint2 . port = ” + p1
. portName ( ) + ”)”
else ””
;
S t r ing c a l c P o r t S t r i n g ( Class n , CommunicationPath cp ) :
( ( ( Node )n ) . getPort ( cp ) . name ) ;
22
St r ing getAddKnowledgeMessage ( Class c ) :
l et a t t s = c . ge tAtt r ibute s InCorrec tOrder ( ) :
l et vars = a t t s . ge tUn iqueVar iab l e s4Proper t i e s ( ) :
l et p r e f = ”sub”+convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)+”(” :
l et post = ” , adset )” :
l et subs = getAddKnowledgeRec
( att s , vars , pre f , post ) :
l et betw = ” ”+convertSymbol (” union ”)+” ” :
l et r i g h t = ( subs . isEmpty
? convertSymbol (” emptyset ”) : subs . ppList ( betw ) ) :
”sub−”+c . name+” : sub”+convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)+”
( amessage (” + c . getMK
( ) +”) , adset ) = ” + r i g h t + ” ; used f o r : s , l s ;\n”
;
L i s t [ S t r ing ] getAddKnowledgeSelectors
( Class c , S t r ing what ) :
l et v = c . varname ( ) :
l et a t t s = c . ownedAttribute :
l et p r e f = ”sub”+convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)+”(” :
l et post = ” , adset )” :
l et s t r s = a t t s . c o l l e c t ( a | a . addKnowledge
( v+”.”+a . name , pre f , post ) ) . s e l e c t ( s | s != ””) :
l et betw = ” ”+convertSymbol (” union ”)+” ” :
l et r i g h t = ( s t r s . isEmpty
? convertSymbol (” emptyset ”) : s t r s . ppList ( betw ) ) :
l et ato = ”a”+what . toLower ( ) :
”sub−”+c . name+”−”+what+” : sub”+convertSymbol
(” i n t e g r a l ”)+”(”+ ato+”(”+c .WRAP2( what)+”
(”+v+”)) , adset ) = ”+r i g h t +”; used f o r : s , l s ;\n”
;
L i s t [ S t r ing ] getAddKnowledgeRec
( L i s t [ Property ] at t s , L i s t [ S t r ing ] vars , S t r ing p r e f
, S t r ing post ) :
( a t t s . isEmpty ? {} :
( l et s t r = addKnowledge ( a t t s . f i r s t ( ) , vars . f i r s t
( ) , pre f , post ) :
( l et r e s t = getAddKnowledgeRec ( a t t s . w i thoutF i r s t
( ) , vars . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) , pre f , post ) :
( s t r == ”” ? r e s t : { s t r } . addAll ( r e s t )
) ) ) ) ;
S t r ing addKnowledge
( Property att , S t r ing v , S t r ing pre f , S t r ing post ) :
( a t t . type . name
== ” Sec r e t ”) ?(”{ a s e c r e t (” + v + ”) }” ) :
( ( a t t . type . name
== ”Nonce ”) ?(”{ anonce (” + v + ”) }” ) :
( ( a t t . type . name
== ”SymmKey”) ?(”{ asymmkey(” + v + ”) }” ) :
( ( a t t . type . name
== ”PublicKey ”) ?(”{ apubl i ckey (” + v + ”) }” ) :
( ( a t t . type . name
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== ” PrivateKey ”)?(”{ apr ivatekey (” + v + ”) }” ) :
( ( a t t . hasHashedStereotype ( ) )
?(”{ ahasheddata (” + v + ”) }” ) :
( ( a t t . hasS ignedStereotype ( ) )
?(”{ as igneddata (” + v + ”) }” ) :
( ( a t t . hasEncryptedStereotype ( ) )
?(”{ aencdata (” + v + ”) }” ) :
( ( a t t . hasEncryptedAsymmStereotype ( ) )
?(”{ aencdataasymm (” + v + ”) }” ) :
( ( ! ( a t t . type . name == ”Number”) &&
! ( a t t . type . name == ” St r ing ”) &&
! ( a t t . type . name == ” Boolean ”) ) ?
( p r e f+”adata (” + at t . type .WRAP2(” data”)+”
(” + v + ”))”+ post ) :
( ” ” ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ;
S t r ing toAttackerData ( Property att , S t r ing v ) :
( a t t . type . name
== ” Sec r e t ”) ?(” a s e c r e t (” + v + ” ) ” ) :
( ( a t t . type . name
== ”Nonce ”) ?(” anonce (” + v + ” ) ” ) :
( ( a t t . type . name
== ”SymmKey”) ?(”asymmkey(” + v + ” ) ” ) :
( ( a t t . type . name
== ”PublicKey ”) ?(” apubl i ckey (” + v + ” ) ” ) :
( ( a t t . type . name
== ” PrivateKey ”)?(” apr ivatekey (” + v + ” ) ” ) :
( ( a t t . hasHashedStereotype ( ) )
?(” ahasheddata (” + v + ” ) ” ) :
( ( a t t . hasS ignedStereotype ( ) )
?(” as igneddata (” + v + ” ) ” ) :
( ( a t t . hasEncryptedStereotype ( ) )
?(” aencdata (” + v + ” ) ” ) :
( ( a t t . hasEncryptedAsymmStereotype ( ) )
?(” aencdataasymm (” + v + ” ) ” ) :
( ( ! ( a t t . type . name == ”Number”) &&
! ( a t t . type . name == ” St r ing ”) &&
! ( a t t . type . name == ” Boolean ”) ) ?
(” adata (” + at t . type .WRAP2(” data”)+”
(” + v + ” ) ) ” ) :
( ” ” ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ;
S t r ing ca lcu lateGenerateData ( Class c ) :
ca lcu lateGenerateData4data ( c ) +
calculateGenerateData4SignData ( c ) +
calcu lateGenerateData4Pla inData ( c ) +
calculateGenerateData4HashData ( c ) ;
S t r ing ca lcu lateGenerateData4data ( Class c ) :
c . name . toFirstLower
( ) + ”4 data : adset ” + convertSymbol (” grgr ”) +
” adata (” + c .WRAP2(” data ”) + ”(” + c . getMK
( ) +”))” + ca l cu la t eGenera teCond i t i on
( c ) + ” ; used f o r : s , l s ; \n”
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;S t r ing calculateGenerateData4SignData ( Class c ) :
( c . hasSignDataStereotype ( ) ?
c . name . toFirstLower
( ) + ”4 SignData : adset ” + convertSymbol
(” grgr ”) +
” as igndata (” + c .WRAP2(” SignData ”) + ”
(” + c . getMK
( ) +”))” + ca l cu la t eGenera teCond i t i on
( c ) + ” ; used f o r : s , l s ; \n” :
” ” ) ;
S t r ing ca lcu lateGenerateData4Pla inData ( Class c ) :
( c . hasPla inDataStereotype ( ) ?
c . name . toFirstLower
( ) + ”4 PlainData : adset ” + convertSymbol
(” grgr ”) +
” ap la indata (” + c .WRAP2(” PlainData ”) + ”
(” + c . getMK
( ) +”))” + ca l cu la t eGenera teCond i t i on
( c ) + ” ; used f o r : s , l s ; \n” :
” ” ) ;
S t r ing calculateGenerateData4HashData ( Class c ) :
( c . hasHashDataStereotype ( ) ?
c . name . toFirstLower
( ) + ”4HashData : adset ” + convertSymbol
(” grgr ”) +
” ahashdata (” + c .WRAP2(” HashData ”) + ”
(” + c . getMK
( ) +”))” + ca l cu la t eGenera teCond i t i on
( c ) + ” ; used f o r : s , l s ; \n” :
” ” ) ;
S t r ing ca lcu lateGenerateMessage ( Class c ) :
” generate−”+c . name+” : adset ”+convertSymbol
(” grgr ”)+” amessage (” + c . getMK
( ) +”)” + ca l cu la t eGenera teCond i t i on
( c ) + ” ; used f o r : s , l s ;\n ” ;
S t r ing ca l cu la t eGenerateCond i t i on ( Class c ) :
l et a t t s = c . ge tAtt r ibute s InCorrec tOrder ( ) :
( a t t s . f o r A l l ( a | a . type . i sPr imit iveType ( ) ) ? ”” :
(” ” + convertSymbol
(” equ iva l en t ”) + ” ” + a t t s
. ca l cu la teGenerateCond i t i on2
( a t t s . g e tUn iqueVar iab l e s4Proper t i e s ( ) , c ) )
) ;
S t r ing ca l cu la teGenerateCond i t i on2
( L i s t [ Property ] lp , L i s t [ S t r ing ] vars , Class c ) :
l et s t r s = lp . ca l cu l a t eGene ra t eCond i t i on2 rec
( vars , c , {}) :
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l et goods t r s = s t r s . r e j e c t ( s | s == ””) :
ppList ( goodstrs , ” and ” ) ;
L i s t [ S t r ing ] ca l cu l a t eGenera t eCond i t i on2rec
( L i s t [ Property ] lp , L i s t [ S t r ing ] vars , Class c
, L i s t [ S t r ing ] done ) :
( lp . isEmpty ? done :
( l et props t r = ( lp . f i r s t ( ) . type . i sPr imit iveType ( )
? ”” :
” adset ” + convertSymbol
(” grgr ”) + ” ” + ( lp . f i r s t
( ) . toAttackerData ( vars . f i r s t
( ) ) ) ) :
lp . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . ca l cu l a t eGene ra t eCond i t i on2 rec
( vars . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) , c , ( L i s t [ S t r ing ] ) done . add
( props t r ) )
) ) ;
S t r ing generateIntInAxiom ( Class c ) :
l et nam = ” int−in−”+c . name+” : ” :
l et fma = ” j ”+convertSymbol (” in ”) + ” ” + c . getMK
( ) + ” ” :
l et r e s t = ” ; used f o r : s , l s ;\n” :
l et a t t s = c . ge tAtt r ibute s InCorrec tOrder ( ) :
l et vars = a t t s . ge tUn iqueVar iab l e s4Proper t i e s ( ) :
l et subs = intInAxiomRec ( att s , vars ) :
( subs . isEmpty
? nam + convertSymbol (” not ”) + fma + r e s t :
( subs . s i z e
== 1
? nam + fma + convertSymbol
(” equ iva l en t ”) + ” ” + subs . f i r s t ( ) + r e s t :
nam + fma + convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”) + ” not not
(” + subs . ppList (” or ”) + ”)” + r e s t
) )
;
S t r ing generatePlainDataIntInAxiom ( Class c ) :
l et nam = ” int−in−”+c . name+”−PlainData : ” :
l et fma = ” j ”+convertSymbol (” in ”) + ” ” + c .WRAP2
(” PlainData ”) + ”(” + varname ( c . name) + ”) ” :
l et r i g h t = convertSymbol
(” equ iva l en t ”) + ” j ”+convertSymbol
(” in ”) + ” ” + varname ( c . name) :
l et r e s t = ” ; used f o r : s , l s ;\n” :
nam + fma + r i g h t + r e s t
;
L i s t [ S t r ing ] intInAxiomRec
( L i s t [ Property ] at t s , L i s t [ S t r ing ] vars ) :
( a t t s . isEmpty ? {} :
( l et su = intInAxiom ( a t t s . f i r s t ( ) , vars . f i r s t ( ) ) :
( l et r e s t = intInAxiomRec ( a t t s . w i thoutF i r s t
( ) , vars . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) ) :
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( su == ”” ? r e s t : { su } . addAll ( r e s t )
) ) ) ) ;
S t r ing intInAxiom ( Property p , S t r ing v ) :
(p . type . name == ”Number” ? ” j = ” + v :
(p . i sCryptoAtt ( ) ? ”” :
(p . i sPr imit iveType ( ) ? ”” :
” j ”+convertSymbol (” in ”) + ” ” + v
) ) ) ;
S t r ing generateConstantsDi f fAxioms
( L i s t [ Class ] c l a s s e s ) :
( l et a t t s = c l a s s e s . s impleConstantAttr ibutes ( ) :
a t t s . g ene ra t eCons tant sD i f f s ( ) ) ;
L i s t [ Property ] s impleConstantAttr ibutes
( L i s t [ Class ] c l a s s e s ) :
( c l a s s e s . s i z e == 0 ? {} :
( c l a s s e s . f i r s t ( ) . ownedAttribute . s e l e c t
( a | a . de fau l tVa lue == null )
. addAll ( c l a s s e s . w i thoutF i r s t
( ) . s impleConstantAttr ibutes ( ) )
) ) ;
S t r ing gene ra t eCons tant sD i f f s ( L i s t [ Property ] a t t s ) :
( a t t s . s i z e < 2 ? ”” :
generateConstantsDi f f sOne ( a t t s . f i r s t
( ) , a t t s . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) ) +
a t t s . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . g ene ra t eCons tan t sD i f f s ( ) ) ;
S t r ing generateConstantsDi f f sOne
( Property a , L i s t [ Property ] a t t s ) :
( a t t s . s i z e == 0 ? ”” :
” d i f f : ” + a . name + ” \\neq ” + a t t s . f i r s t
( ) . name + ” ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;\n” +




Transformations for the attacker
abilities
IMPORT uml
EXTENSION templates : : g e t t e r
EXTENSION templates : : a t t a cke r
EXTENSION templates : : deployment
DEFINE Root FOR uml : : Model
EXPAND generateFromClassDiagram
IF t h i s . getDeploymentDiagram ( ) != n u l l
EXPAND g e n e r a t e A t t a c k e r A b i l i t i e s
ENDIF
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateFromClassDiagram FOR Model
EXPAND generateAttackerData FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateAttackerDataSet FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateAttackerknowledge FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateAnalyze FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateAddAttackerdata FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateGenerate FOR t h i s
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE g e n e r a t e A t t a c k e r A b i l i t i e s FOR Model
FILE ” A t t a c k e r A b i l i t i e s / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”
enr i ch connect ionPreds with
p r e d i c a t e s
eavesdrop : connect ion ;
suppres s : connect ion ;
send : connect ion ;
at tacker−can−read : connect ion ;
at tacker−can−send : connect i ons ;
at tacker−can−send : endpoint
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) connec t i ons ;
at tacker−can−suppres s : endpoint
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) connec t i ons ;
at tacker−can−suppres s : connect ion
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) connec t i ons ;
28
attacker−can−suppres s : connect i ons ;
axioms
attacker−can−read
: convertSymbol (” f o l l o w s ”)
attacker−can−read ( conn )
convertSymbol
(” equ iva l en t ”) i s−endpoint
( at tacker , conn )
convertSymbol
(” or ”) eavesdrop ( conn )
;
at tacker−can−send−conn
: convertSymbol (” f o l l o w s ”)
attacker−can−send ( connect i ons )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”) (
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”) endp
. attacker−can−send ( endp , connect i ons ) )
;
at tacker−can−send
: convertSymbol (” f o l l o w s ”)
attacker−can−send ( endp , connect i ons )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
convertSymbol (” not ”) i s a t t a c k e r
( endp . agent )
convertSymbol (” and ”) (
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”) conn .
conn
convertSymbol
(” in ”) connec t i ons
convertSymbol
(” and ”) i s−endpoint
( endp , conn )
convertSymbol
(” and ”) send ( conn ) )
;
at tacker−can−suppress−endpoint
: convertSymbol (” f o l l o w s ”)
attacker−can−suppres s ( endp , connect i ons )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”) (
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”) conn .
conn
convertSymbol
(” in ”) connec t i ons
convertSymbol
(” and ”) i s−endpoint
( endp , conn )
convertSymbol
(” and ”) suppres s
( conn ) )
;
at tacker−can−suppress−conn
: convertSymbol (” f o l l o w s ”)
attacker−can−suppres s ( conn , connec t i ons )
convertSymbol
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(” equ iva l en t ”) conn
convertSymbol
(” in ”) connec t i ons
convertSymbol
(” and ”) suppres s ( conn )
;
at tacker−can−suppress−any
: convertSymbol (” f o l l o w s ”)
attacker−can−suppres s ( connect i ons )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”) (
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”) endp
. attacker−can−suppres s ( endp , connect i ons ) )
;
eavesdrop :
convertSymbol (” f o l l o w s ”)
 t h i s
. ca lcAttackerReadToStr ings
( ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
suppres s :
convertSymbol (” f o l l o w s ”)
 t h i s
. ca l cAttackerSuppres sToStr ings
( ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
send : convertSymbol (” f o l l o w s ”)
 t h i s
. ca lcAttackerSendToStr ings
( ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
end enr i ch
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateAttackerData FOR Model
FILE ” at tackerdata / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
us ing messagefuns
at tackerdata = amessage ( .
. message : message ) with i s ames sage
IF t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
| asymmkey ( . . key : SymmKey) with is asymmkey
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesASymmKey()−
| apubl i ckey ( .
. key : PublicKey ) with i s a p u b l i c k e y
| apr ivatekey ( .
. key : PrivateKey ) with i s a p r i v a t e k e y
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . e x i s t s S e c r e t ( ) | | t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
| a s e c r e t ( . . s e c r e t : Sec r e t ) with i s a s e c r e t
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . ex i s t sNonce ( ) | | t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
| anonce ( . . nonce : Nonce ) with i s anonce
ENDIF−
IF ! t h i s . getNormalClasses ( ) . isEmpty−
| adata ( . . data : data ) with i s a d a t a
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ENDIF−
IF ! t h i s . g e t P l a i n C l a s s e s ( ) . isEmpty−
| ap la indata ( .
. p l a indata : PlainData ) with i s a p l a i n d a t a
ENDIF−
IF ! t h i s . getHashClasses ( ) . isEmpty−
| ahashdata ( .
. hashdata : HashData ) with i s ahashdata
ENDIF−
IF ! t h i s . g e tS i gnC la s s e s ( ) . isEmpty−
| as igndata ( .
. s i gndata : SignData ) with i s a s i g n d a t a
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesEncrypt ion ()−
| aencdata ( . . encdata : EncData ) with i s a e n c d a t a
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesAsymmEncryption()−
| aencdataasymm ( .
. encdataasymm : EncDataAsymm)
with is aencdataasymm
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesHashing ()−
| ahasheddata ( .
. hasheddata : HashedData ) with i s ahasheddata
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . u s e sS i gn ing ()−
| as igneddata ( .
. s igneddata : SignedData ) with i s a s i g n e d d a t a
ENDIF−
;
v a r i a b l e s
ad : a t tacke rdata ;
end data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateAttackerDataSet FOR Model
FILE ” a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
a c t u a l i z e set−union with at tacke rdata by morphism
elem
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) at tackerdata ; s e t
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t ; a
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) ad ; b
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) ad0 ; c
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) ad1 ;
s convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) adset ; s0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) adset0 ; s1
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) adset1 ; s2
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convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) adset2 ;
end a c t u a l i z e
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateAttackerknowledge FOR Model
FILE ” submessages / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
LET ”sub”+convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”) AS sub i
enr i ch a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t with
f u n c t i o n s
 sub i : a t tacke rdata
convertSymbol
(” t imes ”) a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”
) a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t ; comment
: known d i r e c t subdata ;
IF t h i s . usesEncrypt ion ( ) | | t h i s
. usesAsymmEncryption ( ) | | t h i s . usesSymmKey ( ) | | t h i s
. usesASymmKey()−p r e d i c a t e sENDIF
IF t h i s . usesEncrypt ion ()−
can decrypt : EncData
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesAsymmEncryption()−
can decrypt : EncDataAsymm
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesSymmKey ( ) | | t h i s . usesASymmKey()−
no−keys : a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t ;
ENDIF−
axioms
( : messages : )
FOREACH t h i s




( : content o f messages : )
FOREACH t h i s . getNormalClasses ( ) AS c−
c . getAddKnowledgeSelectors (” data”)−
ENDFOREACH−
( : crypto data : )
FOREACH t h i s . g e t P l a i n C l a s s e s ( ) AS c−
c
. getAddKnowledgeSelectors (” PlainData”)−
ENDFOREACH−
FOREACH t h i s . getHashClasses ( ) AS c−
c
. getAddKnowledgeSelectors (” HashData”)−
ENDFOREACH−
FOREACH t h i s . g e tS i gnC la s s e s ( ) AS c−
c
. getAddKnowledgeSelectors (” SignData”)−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ENDFOREACH−
( : p r ede f in ed / s p e c i a l data : )
IF t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
sub−SymmKey : sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)(asymmkey(
varname (”SymmKey”) ) , adset ) =
convertSymbol
(” emptyset ”) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesASymmKey()−
sub−PublicKey : sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)( apubl i ckey (
varname (” PublicKey ”) ) , adset ) =
convertSymbol
(” emptyset ”) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
sub−PrivateKey : sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)( apr ivatekey (
varname (” PrivateKey ”) ) , adset ) =
convertSymbol
(” emptyset ”) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesEncrypt ion ()−
can decrypt : can decrypt (
varname (” EncData ”) , adset )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)
varname (”SymmKey”) . asymmkey(
varname (”SymmKey”))
convertSymbol (” in ”) adset
convertSymbol
(” and ”) can decrypt (
varname (”SymmKey”) ,
varname (” EncData ”) ) ;
subEncData−yes : can decrypt (
varname (” EncData ”) , adset )
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)( aencdata
(varname
(” EncData ”) ) , adset ) = sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)
( ap la indata (
varname (” EncData ”)
. p l a i n ) , adset ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
subEncData−no :
convertSymbol (” not ”) can decrypt (
varname (” EncData ”) , adset )
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)( aencdata
(varname
(” EncData ”) ) , adset ) =
convertSymbol
(” emptyset ”) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesAsymmEncryption()−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can decrypt asymm : can decrypt (
varname (”EncDataAsymm”) , adset )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)
varname (” PrivateKey ”)
. apr ivatekey (
varname (” PrivateKey ”))
convertSymbol (” in ”) adset
convertSymbol
(” and ”) can decrypt (
varname
(” PrivateKey ”) ,
varname
(”EncDataAsymm”) ) ;
subEncDataAsymm−yes : can decrypt (
varname (”EncDataAsymm”) , adset )
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)
( aencdataasymm (
varname
(”EncDataAsymm”) ) , adset ) = sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)
( ap la indata (
varname (”EncDataAsymm”)
. p l a i n ) , adset ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
subEncDataAsymm−no :
convertSymbol (” not ”) can decrypt (
varname (”EncDataAsymm”) , adset )
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)
( aencdataasymm (
varname
(”EncDataAsymm”) ) , adset ) =
convertSymbol
(” emptyset ”) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . e x i s t s S e c r e t ( ) | | t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
sub−Sec r e t : sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)( a s e c r e t (
varname (” Sec r e t ”) ) , adset ) =
convertSymbol
(” emptyset ”) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . ex i s t sNonce ( ) | | t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
sub−Nonce : sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)( anonce (
varname (” Nonce ”) ) , adset ) =
convertSymbol
(” emptyset ”) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesHashing ()−
sub−hashed : sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)( ahasheddata (
varname (” HashedData ”) ) , adset ) =
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convertSymbol
(” emptyset ”) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . u s e sS i gn ing ()−
sub−s igned : sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)( as igneddata (
varname (” SignedData ”) ) , adset ) =
convertSymbol
(” emptyset ”) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesSymmKey ( ) | | t h i s . usesASymmKey()−
( : other axioms : )
no−keys−de f : no−keys ( adset ) <−>
convertSymbol (” a l l ”) ad . ad
convertSymbol (” in ”) adset −>
IF t h i s . usesSymmKey ( ) && t h i s . uses
ASymmKey()−
not is asymmkey ( ad ) and not i s a p r i v a t e k e y ( ad ) ;
ELSEIF t h i s
. usesSymmKey ( )not is asymmkey ( ad ) ;
ELSEnot i s a p r i v a t e k e y ( ad ) ;
ENDIF−
ENDIF−
( : generated theorems : )
IF t h i s . o n l y T r i v i a l U s e r C l a s s e s ( )
user−message−empty :
i s u s e r m e s s a g e (msg) −>
sub\ i n t e g r a l ( amessage (msg ) , adset ) = \ emptyset ;
used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . usesASymmKey()−
subint−publ i ckey :
 sub i( ad , adset ++ apubl i ckey ( a PublicKey ) )
=  sub i( ad , adset ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . usesAsymmEncryption()−
subint−encdataasymm :
 sub i( ad , adset ++ aencdataasymm (a EncDataAsymm ) )
=  sub i( ad , adset ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . usesEncrypt ion ()−
subint−encdatasymm :
 sub i( ad , adset ++ aencdata ( a EncData ) )
=  sub i( ad , adset ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . ex i s t sNonce ( ) | | t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
subint−nonce :
 sub i( ad , adset ++ anonce ( a Nonce ) )
=  sub i( ad , adset ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . e x i s t s S e c r e t ( ) | | t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
subint−s e c r e t :
 sub i( ad , adset ++ a s e c r e t ( a S e c r e t ) )
=  sub i( ad , adset ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
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ENDIF
IF t h i s . usesHashing ()−
subint−hasheddata :
 sub i( ad , adset ++ ahasheddata ( a HashedData ) )
=  sub i( ad , adset ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . u s e sS i gn ing ()−
subint−s igneddata :
 sub i( ad , adset ++ as igneddata ( a SignedData ) )
=  sub i( ad , adset ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . usesAsymmEncryption()−
subint−no−keys−encdataasymm :
no−keys ( adset ) −>
 sub i( aencdataasymm (a EncDataAsymm ) , adset )
= \ emptyset ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . usesEncrypt ion ()−
subint−no−keys−encdatasymm :
no−keys ( adset ) −>
 sub i( aencdata ( a EncData ) , adset ) = \ emptyset ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . usesSymmKey ( ) | | t h i s . usesASymmKey()−
IF t h i s . usesAsymmEncryption()−
no−keys−encdataasymm :
no−keys ( adset ++ aencdataasymm (a EncDataAsymm ) )
<−> no−keys ( adset ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . usesEncrypt ion ()−
no−keys−encdatasymm :
no−keys ( adset ++ aencdata ( a EncData ) )
<−> no−keys ( adset ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . usesASymmKey()−
no−keys−publ i ckey :
no−keys ( adset ++ apubl i ckey ( a PublicKey ) )
<−> no−keys ( adset ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . ex i s t sNonce ( ) | | t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
no−keys−nonce :
no−keys ( adset ++ anonce ( a Nonce ) )
<−> no−keys ( adset ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . e x i s t s S e c r e t ( ) | | t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
no−keys−s e c r e t :
no−keys ( adset ++ a s e c r e t ( a S e c r e t ) )
<−> no−keys ( adset ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . u s e sS i gn ing ()−
no−keys−s igneddata :
no−keys ( adset ++ as igneddata ( a SignedData ) )
<−> no−keys ( adset ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
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ENDIF
IF t h i s . usesHashing ()−
no−keys−hasheddata :
no−keys ( adset ++ ahasheddata ( a HashedData ) )
<−> no−keys ( adset ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
ENDIF




DEFINE generateAnalyze FOR Model−
FILE ”Analyze/ s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
LET ”max”+convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”) AS maxi
LET convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”) AS i n t e g
enr i ch submessages with
f u n c t i o n s
 i n t e g . : a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t ;
p r e d i c a t e s
maxi . : a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t ;
axioms
add−max : max
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”) adset
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
convertSymbol
(” i n t e g r a l ”
) adset = adset ; used f o r : s , l s ;
add−r e c : ad convertSymbol (” in ”) adset
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”) adset =
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”) ( adset
convertSymbol (” union ”) sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)
( ad , adset ) ) ;
maxknown : max
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”) adset
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”) (
convertSymbol (” a l l ”) ad . ad
convertSymbol (” in ”) adset
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) ( sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)
( ad , adset )
convertSymbol
(” subseteq ”) adset ) ) ;
( : generated theorems : )
add−subset : adset
convertSymbol (” subseteq ”)
convertSymbol
(” i n t e g r a l ”
) adset ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
integ−i s−max : maxi
 i n t e g adset ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
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IF t h i s . e x i s t s S e c r e t ( ) | | t h i s
. usesSymmKey()−max−known−s e c r e t −01 :
maxi adset −>
maxi ( adset ++ a s e c r e t ( a S e c r e t ) ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
max−known−s e c r e t :
maxi adset
−>  i n t e g ( adset ++ a s e c r e t ( a S e c r e t ) )
= adset ++ a s e c r e t ( a S e c r e t ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . ex i s t sNonce ( ) | | t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
max−known−nonce :
maxi adset
−>  i n t e g ( adset ++ anonce ( a Nonce ) )
= adset ++ anonce ( a Nonce ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
max−known−nonce−01 :
maxi adset
−> maxi ( adset ++ anonce ( a Nonce ) ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . u s e sS i gn ing ()−
max−known−s igneddata :
maxi adset
−>  i n t e g ( adset ++ as igneddata ( a SignedData ) )
= adset ++ as igneddata ( a SignedData ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
max−known−s igneddata−01 :
maxi adset
−> maxi ( adset ++ as igneddata ( a SignedData ) ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . usesHashing ()−
max−known−hasheddata :
maxi adset
−>  i n t e g ( adset ++ ahasheddata ( a HashedData ) )
= adset ++ ahasheddata ( a HashedData ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
max−known−hasheddata−01 :
maxi adset
−> maxi ( adset ++ ahasheddata ( a HashedData ) ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . usesSymmKey ( ) | | t h i s . usesASymmKey()−
IF t h i s . usesAsymmEncryption()−
max−known−encdataasymm :
no−keys ( adset ) and maxi adset
−>  i n t e g ( adset ++ aencdataasymm (a EncDataAsymm ) )
= adset ++ aencdataasymm (a EncDataAsymm) ;
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used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
max−known−encdataasymm−01 :
no−keys ( adset ) and maxi adset
−> maxi ( adset ++ aencdataasymm (a EncDataAsymm ) ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . usesEncrypt ion ()−
max−known−encdatasymm :
no−keys ( adset ) and maxi adset
−>  i n t e g ( adset ++ aencdata ( a EncData ) )
= adset ++ aencdata ( a EncData ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
max−known−encdatasymm−01 :
no−keys ( adset ) and maxi adset
−> maxi ( adset ++ aencdata ( a EncData ) ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
ENDIF




DEFINE generateAddAttackerdata FOR Model−
FILE ”AddAttackerdata/ s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
enr i ch Analyze , m e s s a g e l i s t with
f u n c t i o n s
.
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)
+ . : a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) message
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t ;
.
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)
+ . : a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t
convertSymbol
(” t imes ”) m e s s a g e l i s t
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t ;
axioms
IF t h i s . usesEncrypt ion ( ) | | t h i s
. usesAsymmEncryption()−
add−one : adset
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)+ msg =
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”) ( adset
convertSymbol (” union ”) sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)( amessage
(msg ) , adset ) ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ELSE−
add−one : adset
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)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+ msg = adset
convertSymbol (” union ”) sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)( amessage
(msg ) , adset ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
add−empty : adset
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)+ [ ] =
convertSymbol
(” i n t e g r a l ”) adset ; used f o r : l s ;
adds−r e c : adset
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)+ (msg ’
+ msgs ) = ( adset
convertSymbol (” union ”) sub
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)( amessage
(msg ) , adset ) )
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)
+ msgs ; used f o r : l s ;
end enr i ch
ENDFILE−
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateGenerate FOR Model
FILE ” Generate / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”
enr i ch AddAttackerdata with
p r e d i c a t e s
.
convertSymbol (” grgr ”)
. : a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) at tackerdata ;
axioms
IF t h i s . ex i s t sNonce ( ) | | t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
nonce : adset
convertSymbol (” grgr ”) anonce (
varname (” Nonce ”))
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”) anonce
(varname (” Nonce ”))
convertSymbol
(” in ”) adset ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . e x i s t s S e c r e t ( ) | | t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
s e c r e t : adset
convertSymbol (” grgr ”) a s e c r e t (
varname (” Sec r e t ”))
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”) a s e c r e t
(varname (” Sec r e t ”))
convertSymbol
(” in ”) adset ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
symmkey : adset
convertSymbol (” grgr ”) asymmkey(
varname (”SymmKey”))




(” in ”) adset ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesASymmKey()−
publ i ckey : adset
convertSymbol (” grgr ”) apubl i ckey (
varname (” PublicKey ”) ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
p r iva tekey : adset
convertSymbol (” grgr ”) apr ivatekey (
varname (” PrivateKey ”))
convertSymbol
(” equ iva l en t ”) apr ivatekey (
varname (” PrivateKey ”))
convertSymbol
(” in ”) adset ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesHashing ()−
hasheddata : adset
convertSymbol (” grgr ”) ahasheddata (
varname (” HashedData ”))
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
ahasheddata (varname (” HashedData ”))
convertSymbol (” in ”) adset
convertSymbol (” or ”) adset
convertSymbol (” grgr ”)
ahashdata (varname (” HashedData ”) . hash ) ;
used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesEncrypt ion ()−
encdata : adset
convertSymbol (” grgr ”)
aencdata (mkEncData(varname (”SymmKey”) ,
varname (” PlainData ”) ) )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
aencdata (mkEncData(varname (”SymmKey”) ,
varname (” PlainData ”) ) )
convertSymbol (” in ”)
adset convertSymbol (” or ”)
( adsetconvertSymbol (” grgr ”)
asymmkey(varname (”SymmKey”))
convertSymbol (” and ”) adset
convertSymbol (” grgr ”)
ap la indata (varname (” PlainData ”) ) ) ;
used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesAsymmEncryption()−
encdataasymm : adset
convertSymbol (” grgr ”)
aencdataasymm (mkEncDataAsymm(varname (” PublicKey ”) ,
varname (” PlainData ”) ) )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
aencdataasymm (mkEncDataAsymm(varname (” PublicKey ”) ,
varname (” PlainData ”) ) )
convertSymbol (” in ”)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adset convertSymbol (” or ”)
( adset convertSymbol (” grgr ”)
apubl i ckey ( varname (” PublicKey ”))
convertSymbol (” and ”)
adset convertSymbol (” grgr ”)
ap la indata (varname (” PlainData ”) ) ) ;
used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . u s e sS i gn ing ()−
s igneddata : adset
convertSymbol (” grgr ”)
as igneddata ( mkSignedData (varname (” PrivateKey ”) ,
varname (” SignData ”) ) )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
as igneddata ( mkSignedData (varname (” PrivateKey ”) ,
varname (” SignData ”) ) )
convertSymbol (” in ”)
adset convertSymbol (” or ”)
( adset convertSymbol (” grgr ”)
apr ivatekey (varname (” PrivateKey ”))
convertSymbol (” and ”)
adset convertSymbol (” grgr ”)
as igndata (varname (” SignData ”) ) ) ;
used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
( : messages : )
FOREACH t h i s
. getAllMessageAndUserMessageClasses ( ) AS msg−
ca lcu lateGenerateMessage (msg)−
ENDFOREACH−
( : normal , hash , p la in , s i gn c l a s s e s : )
FOREACH t h i s . getNormalClasses ( ) AS c
ca lcu lateGenerateData ( c )
ENDFOREACH
( : generated axioms : )
IF t h i s . o n l y T r i v i a l U s e r C l a s s e s ( )
user−messages−known :
i s u s e r m e s s a g e (msg)
−> adset \ grgr amessage (msg ) ;
used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
ENDIF
generate−max−in :
ad \ in adset and max
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”) adset
−> adset \ grgr ad ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
generate−max−in :
ad \ in adset and max
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”) adset
−> adset0 convertSymbol (” union ”) adset \ grgr ad ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
generate−add−message :
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not adset ++ ad \ grgr amessage (msg)
−> not adset \ grgr amessage (msg ) ;
used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
generate−add :
not adset ++ ad \ grgr ad0
−> not adset \ grgr ad0 ;
used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
generate−subset :
adset \ grgr ad and adset \ subseteq adset0
−> adset0 \ grgr ad ;
used f o r : generated ;
generate−message :
subconvertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)( amessage (msg ) , adset )
convertSymbol (” subseteq ”) \ emptyset ++ ad
−> adset ++ ad \ grgr amessage (msg ) ;
used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
generate−message :
subconvertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)( amessage (msg ) , adset )
convertSymbol (” subseteq ”) \ emptyset ++ ad ++ ad0
−> adset ++ ad ++ ad0 \ grgr amessage (msg ) ;
used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
generate−more :
not adset ++ ad ++ ad0 \ grgr ad1 −> not adset \ grgr ad1 ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
generate−more :
not adset ++ ad \ grgr ad1
−> not adset \ grgr ad1 ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
generate−message−subset :
subconvertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)( amessage (msg ) , adset1 )
convertSymbol (” subseteq ”)
adset and adset1
convertSymbol (” union ”) adset
convertSymbol (” subseteq ”) adset0
−> adset0 \ grgr amessage (msg ) ;
used f o r : generated ;
IF t h i s . usesAsymmEncryption()−
generate−encdataasymm :
aencdataasymm (a EncDataAsymm) \ in adset
−> adset \ grgr aencdataasymm (a EncDataAsymm ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
generate−encdataasymm :
aencdataasymm (a EncDataAsymm) \ in adset
−> adset0convertSymbol (” union ”)
adset \ grgr aencdataasymm (a EncDataAsymm) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
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ENDIF
IF t h i s . usesEncrypt ion ()−
generate−encdata : aencdata ( a EncData ) \ in adset
−> adset \ grgr aencdata ( a EncData ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
generate−encdata :
aencdata ( a EncData ) \ in adset
−> adset0convertSymbol (” union ”)
adset \ grgr aencdata ( a EncData ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . u s e sS i gn ing ()−
generate−s igneddata : as igneddata ( a SignedData ) \ in adset
−> adset \ grgr as igneddata ( a SignedData ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
generate−s igneddata :
as igneddata ( a SignedData ) \ in adset
−> adset0 convertSymbol (” union ”)
adset \ grgr as igneddata ( a SignedData ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . usesHashing ()−
generate−hasheddata :
ahasheddata ( a HashedData ) \ in adset
−> adset \ grgr ahasheddata ( a HashedData ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
generate−hasheddata :
ahasheddata ( a HashedData ) \ in adset
−> adset0convertSymbol (” union ”)
adset \ grgr ahasheddata ( a HashedData ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . ex i s t sNonce ( ) | | t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
generate−nonce :
anonce ( a Nonce ) \ in adset
−> adset \ grgr anonce ( a Nonce ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
generate−nonce :
anonce ( a Nonce ) \ in adset
−> adset0 convertSymbol (” union ”)
adset \ grgr anonce ( a Nonce ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF t h i s . e x i s t s S e c r e t ( ) | | t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
generate−s e c r e t :
a s e c r e t ( a S e c r e t ) \ in adset
−> adset \ grgr a s e c r e t ( a S e c r e t ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
generate−s e c r e t :
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a s e c r e t ( a S e c r e t ) \ in adset
−> adset0 convertSymbol (” union ”)
adset \ grgr a s e c r e t ( a S e c r e t ) ;
used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF








EXTENSION templates : : g e t t e r
DEFINE Root FOR uml : : Model
EXPAND generateFromClassDiagram FOR t h i s
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateFromClassDiagram FOR Model
EXPAND gene ra t eSecur i tyOpera t i ons
IF t h i s . e x i s t s S e c r e t ( ) | | t h i s
. existsSymmKey ( )
EXPAND gene ra t eSec r e tENDIF
IF t h i s . ex i s t sNonce ( ) | | t h i s
. usesSymmKey ( )
EXPAND generateNonceENDIF
IF t h i s . usesSymmKey ( )
EXPAND generateGenerateKey FOR t h i s
ENDIF




DEFINE gene ra t eSec r e t FOR Model
FILE ” Sec r e t / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
us ing s t r i ng−data
Sec r e t = mkSecret ( . . s e c r e t : s t r i n g ) ;
v a r i a b l e s varname (” Sec r e t ”) ,
varname (” Sec r e t ”)0 ,
varname (” Sec r e t ”)1 : Sec r e t ;
end data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateNonce FOR Model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FILE ”Nonce/ s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
us ing s t r i ng−data
Nonce = mkNonce( . . nonce : s t r i n g ) ;
v a r i a b l e s varname (” Nonce ”) ,
varname (” Nonce ”)0 ,
varname (” Nonce ”)1 : Nonce ;
end data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
ENDFILE
FILE ” generateNonce / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
enr i ch Nonce , int−pa i r with
p r e d i c a t e s
. \ in . : Nonce , ( nat −> Nonce ) ;
comment : The given nonce appears somewhere in the stream ;
dups : ( nat −> Nonce ) ;
comment : The stream conta in s d u p l i c a t e s ;
in−r e s t : Nonce , ( nat −> Nonce ) , nat ;
comment : The given nonce appears somewhere in the stream
above the g iven lower l i m i t ;
o ld : Nonce , ( nat −> Nonce ) , nat ;
comment : The given nonce i s old , i . e . does not appear
above the g iven lower l i m i t ;
procedures
generateNonce#(nat 
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) Nonce ) :
nat convertSymbol (” t imes ”) Nonce non func t i ona l ;
v a r i a b l e s
a l l−nonces , a l l−nonces0 : nat
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) Nonce ;
next−nonce : nat ;
axioms
nonce−in−r e s t−de f :
in−r e s t ( a Nonce , a l l−nonces , next−nonce ) <−> ex n
. (n \ge next−nonce and a l l−nonces (n) = a Nonce ) ;
nonce−old−de f : o ld
( a Nonce , a l l−nonces , next−nonce ) <−> not ex n
. (n \ge next−nonce and a l l−nonces (n) = a Nonce ) ;
nonce−in−de f :
a Nonce \ in a l l−nonces <−> ex n
. ( a Nonce = a l l−nonces (n ) ) ;
nonce−dups−de f :
dups ( a l l−nonces ) <−> ex n , n0
. (n \unequal n0 and a l l−nonces (n) = a l l−nonces ( n0 ) ) ;
old−next−nonce :
o ld ( a Nonce , a l l−nonces , next−nonce ) −>
o ld ( a Nonce , a l l−nonces , next−nonce
+ 1 ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
old−next−nonce−nodups :
not dups ( a l l−nonces ) −> o ld ( a l l−nonces
( next−nonce ) , a l l−nonces , next−nonce
+ 1 ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
old−not−th i s−nonce : not o ld ( a l l−nonces
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( next−nonce ) , a l l−nonces , next−nonce
) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
d e c l a r a t i o n
generateNonce :
generateNonce#( a l l−nonces ; var next−nonce ,
varname (” Nonce ”))
begin
varname (” Nonce ”) := a l l−nonces
( next−nonce ) ; next−nonce := next−nonce + 1
end ;
end enr i ch
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateGenerateKey FOR Model
FILE ” generateKey / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
enr i ch generateNonce , Key with
f u n c t i o n s
nonce2key : Nonce −> SymmKey;
procedures
generateKey#
( nat −> Nonce ) : nat , SymmKey non funct i ona l ;
v a r i a b l e s
a l l−nonces : nat −> Nonce ;
next−nonce : nat ;
axioms
nonce2key−de f : nonce2key (mkNonce( s t r ) ) = mkSymmKey
( s t r ) ;
d e c l a r a t i o n
generateKey#:
generateKey#( a l l−nonces ; var next−nonce ,
varname (”SymmKey”))
begin
varname (”SymmKey”) := nonce2key ( a l l−nonces
( next−nonce ) ) ; next−nonce := next−nonce + 1
end ;
end enr i ch
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateKeys FOR Model
FILE ”Key/ s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
us ing s t r i ng−data
IF t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
SymmKey = mkSymmKey( . . key : s t r i n g ) with isSymmKey ;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesASymmKey()−
PrivateKey = mkPrivateKey ( .
. key : s t r i n g ) with i sPr ivateKey ;
PublicKey = mkPublicKey ( .
. key : s t r i n g ) with isPubl icKey ;
ENDIF−
v a r i a b l e s
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IF t h i s . usesSymmKey()−
varname (”SymmKey”) ,
varname (”SymmKey”)0 ,
varname (”SymmKey”)1 : SymmKey;
ENDIF−
IF t h i s . usesASymmKey()−
varname (” PrivateKey ”) ,
varname (” PrivateKey ”)0 ,
varname (” PrivateKey ”)1 : PrivateKey ;
varname (” PublicKey ”) ,
varname (” PublicKey ”)0 ,
varname (” PublicKey ”)1 : PublicKey ;
ENDIF−
end data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE gene ra t eSecur i tyOpera t i ons FOR Model
FILE ” Secur i tyOperat ions / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
enr i ch data with
LET t h i s . usesHashing ( ) AS hasHashed−
LET t h i s . usesEncrypt ion ( ) AS hasEncrypted−
LET t h i s . usesAsymmEncryption ( )
AS hasEncryptedAsymm−
LET t h i s . u s e sS i gn ing ( ) AS hasSigned−
LET t h i s . g e t C e r t i f i c a t e C l a s s e s ( ) AS ce r t s−
LET t h i s . usesSymmKey ( ) AS hasSymmKey−
LET hasHashed | | hasEncrypted | | hasEncryptedAsymm | | hasSigned | |
( ! c e r t s . isEmpty ) | | hasSymmKey AS usesCrypto−
IF usesCrypto−




convertSymbol (” t imes ”) PlainData
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) EncData ;
decrypt : SymmKey
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) EncData




convertSymbol (” t imes ”) PlainData
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) EncDataAsymm ;
decrypt : PrivateKey
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) EncDataAsymm
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) PlainData ;
ENDIF−
IF hasSigned−
s i gn : PrivateKey , SignData





convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) HashedData ;
ENDIF−
FOREACH c e r t s AS cert−
g e n e r a t e C e r t i f i c a t e : PrivateKey
convertSymbol (” t imes ”)
 c e r t . g e t C e r t i f i c a t e D a t a C l a s s ( )
. name
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 c e r t . name ;
ENDFOREACH−
IF hasSymmKey−
generateKeyFromSecret : Sec r e t −> SymmKey;
ENDIF−
IF hasHashed | | hasEncrypted | | hasEncryptedAsymm | | hasSigned | |
( ! c e r t s . isEmpty)−
p r e d i c a t e s
ENDIF−
IF hasEncrypted−
can decrypt : SymmKey
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) EncData ;
ENDIF−
IF hasEncryptedAsymm−
can decrypt : PrivateKey
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) EncDataAsymm ;
ENDIF−
IF hasSigned−
v e r i f y : PublicKey , SignedData , SignData ;
ENDIF−
IF hasEncryptedAsymm | | hasSigned−
i s k e y p a i r : PublicKey
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) PrivateKey ;
ENDIF−
IF hasHashed−
ve r i f yha sh : HashedData , HashData ;
ENDIF−
FOREACH c e r t s AS cert−
v e r i f y C e r t i f i c a t e : PublicKey
convertSymbol (” t imes ”)






encrypt−de f : encrypt (
varname (”SymmKey”) ,
varname (” PlainData ”)) = mkEncData(
varname (”SymmKey”) ,
varname
(” PlainData ”) ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
decrypt−de f : can decrypt (
varname (”SymmKey”) , mkEncData(
varname (”SymmKey”)0 ,
varname (” PlainData ”) ) )
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convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) decrypt
(
varname (”SymmKey”) , mkEncData
(varname (”SymmKey”)0 ,
varname
(” PlainData ”) ) ) =
varname
(” PlainData ”
) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
can decrypt−SymmKey−de f : can decrypt (
varname (”SymmKey”) , mkEncData(
varname (”SymmKey”)0 ,
varname (” PlainData ”) ) )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
varname (”SymmKey”) =
varname
(”SymmKey”)0 ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF hasEncryptedAsymm−
encryptAsymm−de f : encrypt (
varname (” PublicKey ”) ,
varname (” PlainData ”)) = mkEncDataAsymm
(varname (” PublicKey ”) ,
varname
(” PlainData ”) ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
decryptAsymm−de f : can decrypt (
varname (” PrivateKey ”) , mkEncDataAsymm(
varname (” PublicKey ”)0 ,
varname (” PlainData ”) ) )
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) decrypt
(
varname
(” PrivateKey ”) , mkEncDataAsymm(
varname (” PublicKey ”)0 ,
varname
(” PlainData ”) ) ) =
varname
(” PlainData ”
) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
can decrypt−PrivateKey : can decrypt (
varname (” PrivateKey ”) , mkEncDataAsymm(
varname (” PublicKey ”)0 ,
varname (” PlainData ”) ) ) <−> i s k e y p a i r
(varname (” PublicKey ”)0 ,
varname
(” PrivateKey ”) ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF
IF hasSigned−
s ign−de f : s i gn (varname (” PrivateKey ”) ,
varname (” SignData ”)) = mkSignedData (
varname (” PrivateKey ”) ,
varname (” SignData ”) ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
v e r i f y−de f : v e r i f y (
varname (” PublicKey ”) , mkSignedData (
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varname (” PrivateKey ”)0 ,
varname (” SignData ”)0) ,
varname (” SignData ”))
convertSymbol
(” equ iva l en t ”) i s k e y p a i r (
varname (” PublicKey ”) ,
varname (” PrivateKey ”)0)
convertSymbol (” and ”)
varname
(” SignData ”) =
varname
(” SignData”
)0 ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF hasEncryptedAsymm | | hasSigned−
i s k e y p a i r−de f : i s k e y p a i r (
varname (” PublicKey ”) ,
varname (” PrivateKey ”)0) <−>
varname (” PublicKey ”) . key =
varname (” PrivateKey ”)0 . key ;
i s k e y p a i r−same : i s k e y p a i r ( mkPublicKey
( s t r ) , mkPrivateKey ( s t r ) ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
ENDIF−
IF hasHashed−
hash−de f : hash (
varname (” HashData ”)) = mkHashedData (
varname (” HashData ”) ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ve r i fyhash−de f : v e r i f yha sh (
varname (” HashedData ”) ,
varname (” HashData ”))
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”) (
varname (” HashedData ”) = mkHashedData
(
varname
(” HashData ”) ) ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDIF−
FOREACH c e r t s AS cert−
g e n e r a t e C e r t i f i c a t e− c e r t . name :
g e n e r a t e C e r t i f i c a t e ( a PrivateKey ,
varname ( c e r t . g e t C e r t i f i c a t e D a t a C l a s s ( )
. name)) =
mk c e r t . name(
varname ( c e r t . g e t C e r t i f i c a t e D a t a C l a s s ( )
. name) ,
s i gn ( a PrivateKey ,
 c e r t . g e t C e r t i f i c a t e D a t a C l a s s ( )
.WRAP2(” SignData ”)(
varname ( c e r t . g e t C e r t i f i c a t e D a t a C l a s s ( )
. name) ) ) ) ;
v e r i f y C e r t i f i c a t e − c e r t . name :
v e r i f y C e r t i f i c a t e ( a PublicKey ,
varname ( c e r t . name)) <−>
v e r i f y ( a PublicKey , varname ( c e r t . name) .
 c e r t . g e t C e r t i f i c a t e S i g n a t u r e A t t r i b u t e ( )
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. name ,
 c e r t . g e t C e r t i f i c a t e D a t a C l a s s ( )
.WRAP2(” SignData ”)(
varname ( c e r t . name) .
 c e r t . g e t C e r t i f i c a t e D a t a A t t r i b u t e ( )




generateKeyFromSecret ( a S e c r e t ) = mkSymmKey( a S e c r e t













EXTENSION templates : : deployment
EXTENSION templates : : g e t t e r
EXTENSION templates : : parse
EXTENSION templates : : a t t a cke r
DEFINE Root FOR uml : : Model






EXPAND generateEndpoint FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateEndpointPreds FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateExagent FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateAgentConsts FOR t h i s
EXPAND g e n e r a t e A l l I n s t a n c e s FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateConnect ion FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateConnect ions FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateConnect ionPreds FOR t h i s
EXPAND generatePort s FOR t h i s
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateEndpoint FOR Model
FILE ” endpoint / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
data s p e c i f i c a t i o n us ing
agentPreds , por t s
endpoint = .
convertSymbol (” odot ”) . ( .
. agent : agent ; . . port : por t s ) ;
v a r i a b l e s
endpoint , endp , endp0 , endp1 , endp2 , endp3 : endpoint ;




DEFINE generateEndpointPreds FOR Model
FILE ” endpointPreds / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
enr i ch connect i ons with
f u n c t i o n s
other−endpoint : endpoint
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) connect ion
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) endpoint ;
p r e d i c a t e s
endpoint−ok : endpoint ;
i s−endpoint : endpoint
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) connect ion ;
i s−endpoint : agent
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) connect ion ;
i s−va l id−port : agent
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) por t s ;
axioms
i s−va l id−port−de f :
i s−va l id−port ( ag , port ) <−> endpoint−ok
( ag \odot port ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
other−endpoint− l e f t : other−endpoint
( endp1 , mk−connect ion
( endp1 , endp2 ) ) = endp2 ; used f o r : s , l s ;
other−endpoint−r i g h t : other−endpoint
( endp2 , mk−connect ion
( endp1 , endp2 ) ) = endp1 ; used f o r : s , l s ;
i s−endpoint−agent−de f :
i s−endpoint ( ag , conn )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”) conn . endpoint1
. agent = ag
convertSymbol (” or ”) conn . endpoint2
. agent = ag ;
i s−endpoint−de f :
i s−endpoint ( endp , conn )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”) ( endp = conn
. endpoint1
convertSymbol (” or ”) endp = conn
. endpoint2 ) ;
endpoint−ok−de f :
endpoint−ok ( endp )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
(
LET t h i s . getAl lNodes ( ) AS nodes−
FOREACH nodes
AS node SEPARATOR convertSymbol (” or”)−
LET node . portNames ( ) AS ports−
FOREACH por t s
AS end SEPARATOR convertSymbol (” or”)−
IF node . i sTermina l ()−
( i s node . name( endp . agent )
convertSymbol (” and ”) ( endp . port =
end ) )
ENDIF−
IF node . isSmartCard ()−
( i s node . name( endp . agent )
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convertSymbol (” and ”) ( endp . port =
end ) )
ENDIF−
IF node . i s S e r v i c e ()−
( i s node . name( endp . agent )
convertSymbol (” and ”) ( endp . port =
end ) )
ENDIF−
IF node . i sUse r ()−
( i s u s e r ( endp . agent )
convertSymbol (” and ”) ( endp . port =
end ) )
ENDIF−
IF node . isSmartCard ( ) && node
. i sFakeCard le t ()−
or ( i s f a k e c a r d l e t ( endp . agent )








end enr i ch
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateExagent FOR Model
LET t h i s . getAl lNodes ( ) AS nodes−
FILE ” exagent / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
enr i ch agentcons t s with
p r e d i c a t e s
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)agent : agent ;
IF nodes . e x i s t s ( e | e . i sTermina l ())−
i s t e r m i n a l : agent ;
ENDIF−
IF nodes . e x i s t s ( e | e . isSmartCard ())−
i s smar t ca rd : agent ;
ENDIF−
IF nodes . e x i s t s ( e | e . i s S e r v i c e ())−
i s s e r v i c e : agent ;
ENDIF−
axioms
FOREACH nodes . s e l e c t ( e | e . i sTermina l ( ) ) AS t−
ex−t . name :
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)agent (
t . name(n ) )
convertSymbol
(” equ iva l en t ”) n < NUMOF
t . name . toUpperCase ( )S ;
ex−t . name−simp : NUMOF
t . name . toUpperCase ( )S
convertSymbol (” l e ”) n
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convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
convertSymbol (” not ”)
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)agent (
t
. name
(n ) ) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
ex−t . name−zero :
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)agent (
t . name ( 0 ) ) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
ENDFOREACH−
FOREACH nodes . s e l e c t ( e | e . isSmartCard ( ) )
AS sc−
ex− sc . name :
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)agent (
 sc . name(n ) )
convertSymbol
(” equ iva l en t ”) n < NUMOF
 sc . name . toUpperCase ( )S ;
ex− sc . name−simp : NUMOF
 sc . name . toUpperCase ( )S
convertSymbol (” l e ”) n
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
convertSymbol (” not ”)
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)agent (
 sc
. name
(n ) ) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
ex− sc . name−zero :
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)agent (
 sc . name ( 0 ) ) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
ENDFOREACH−
FOREACH nodes . s e l e c t ( e | e . i s S e r v i c e ( ) ) AS t−
ex−t . name :
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)agent (
t . name(n ) )
convertSymbol
(” equ iva l en t ”) n < NUMOF
t . name . toUpperCase ( )S ;
ex−t . name−simp : NUMOF
t . name . toUpperCase ( )S
convertSymbol (” l e ”) n
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
convertSymbol (” not ”)
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)agent (
t
. name
(n ) ) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
ex−t . name−zero :
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)agent (
t . name ( 0 ) ) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
ENDFOREACH−
IF nodes . e x i s t s ( e | e . i sUse r ())−
ex−user : exagent ( user (n ) )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”) n < NUMOFUSERS;
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ex−user−zero :
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)agent ( user
( 0 ) ) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
ENDIF−
ex−a t tacke r :
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)agent
( a t ta cke r ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
IF nodes . e x i s t s ( e | e . i sTermina l ())−
i s−t e rmina l : i s t e r m i n a l ( ag )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)−
FOREACH t h i s . getModel ( ) . ge tAl lTermina l s ( )
AS termina l SEPARATOR convertSymbol (” or”)−
i s  t e rmina l . name( ag )ENDFOREACH− ;
ENDIF−
IF nodes . e x i s t s ( e | e . isSmartCard ())−
i s−smartcard : i s smar t ca rd ( ag )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)−
FOREACH t h i s . getModel ( ) . getAl lSmartcards ( )
AS sc SEPARATOR convertSymbol (” or”)−
i s  sc . name( ag )ENDFOREACH− ;
ENDIF−
IF nodes . e x i s t s ( e | e . i s S e r v i c e ())−
i s−s e r v i c e : i s s e r v i c e ( ag )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)−
FOREACH t h i s . getModel ( ) . g e t A l l S e r v i c e s ( )
AS s e r v i c e SEPARATOR convertSymbol (” or”)−
i s  s e r v i c e . name( ag )ENDFOREACH− ;
ENDIF−




DEFINE generateAgentConsts FOR Model
LET t h i s . getAl lNodes ( ) AS nodes−
FILE ” agentcons t s / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
enr i ch endpointPreds with
cons tant s
FOREACH nodes . s e l e c t ( e | e . i sTermina l ( ) ) AS t−
NUMOFt . name . toUpperCase ( )S : nat ;
ENDFOREACH−
FOREACH nodes . s e l e c t ( e | e . isSmartCard ( ) )
AS sc−
NUMOF sc . name . toUpperCase ( )S : nat ;
ENDFOREACH−
FOREACH nodes . s e l e c t ( e | e . i s S e r v i c e ( ) ) AS s−
NUMOFs . name . toUpperCase ( )S : nat ;
ENDFOREACH−
IF nodes . e x i s t s ( e | e . i sUse r ())−
NUMOFUSERS : nat ;
ENDIF−
axioms
FOREACH nodes . s e l e c t ( e | e . i sTermina l ( ) ) AS t−
NUMOF
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t . name . toUpperCase ( )S−not−zero : NUMOF
t . name
. toUpperCase ( )S \neq 0 ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDFOREACH−
FOREACH nodes . s e l e c t ( e | e . isSmartCard ( ) )
AS sc−
NUMOF
 sc . name
. toUpperCase ( )S−not−zero : NUMOF
 sc . name
. toUpperCase ( )S \neq 0 ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDFOREACH−
FOREACH nodes . s e l e c t ( e | e . i s S e r v i c e ( ) ) AS s−
NUMOF
s . name . toUpperCase ( )S−not−zero : NUMOF
s . name
. toUpperCase ( )S \neq 0 ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDFOREACH−
IF nodes . e x i s t s ( e | e . i sUse r ())−
NUMOFUSERS−not−zero : NUMOFUSERS \neq 0 ; used f o r : s
, l s ;
ENDIF−




DEFINE g e n e r a t e A l l I n s t a n c e s FOR Model
LET t h i s . getAl lNodes ( ) . s e l e c t (n | n
. i sTermina l ( ) | | n . isSmartCard ( ) | | n . i s S e r v i c e ( ) )
AS nodes−
FILE ” a l l I n s t a n c e s / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
enr i ch agents , n a t l i s t with
cons tant s
FOREACH nodes AS n−
n . nameA l l I n s t a n c e s : agents ;
ENDFOREACH−
f u n c t i o n s
count−m−to−n : nat , nat −> n a t l i s t ;
FOREACH nodes AS n−
mk
n
. nameA l l I n s t a n c e s : n a t l i s t −> agents ;
ENDFOREACH−
p r e d i c a t e s
FOREACH nodes AS n−




convertSymbol (” l e ”) m −> count−m−to−n
(m, n) = [ ] ; used f o r : s , l s ;
count−m−to−n−r e c : m < n −> count−m−to−n(m, n) = m
+ count−m−to−n(m + 1 , n ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
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FOREACH nodes AS n−
mkn . nameAl l In s tance s−empty : mk
n
. nameA l l I n s t a n c e s ( [ ] ) = [ ] ; used f o r : s , l s ;
mkn . nameAl l In s tance s−r e c : mk
n . nameA l l I n s t a n c e s (m ’ + nats ) =
n . name(m) + mk
n
. nameA l l I n s t a n c e s ( nats ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
n . nameAl l In s tance s−de f :
n . nameA l l I n s t a n c e s = mk
n
. nameA l l I n s t a n c e s ( count−m−to−n (0 , NUMOF
n . name . toUpperCase ( )S ) ) ;
exn . nameAgents−de f : ex
n . nameAgents ( agents ) <−> a l l ag . ag
convertSymbol (” in ”) agents −> exagent
( ag ) and i s n . name( ag ) ;
ENDFOREACH−
( : generated theorems : )
count−m−to−n−dups : not dups ( count−m−to−n
(m, n ) ) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
count−m−to−n−in : m \ in count−m−to−n
(n , n0 ) <−> not not
(n \ l e m and m < n0 ) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
FOREACH nodes AS n−
n . nameAl l In s tance s−dups : not dups (
n
. nameA l l I n s t a n c e s
) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
n . nameAl l In s tance s−in : ag \ in
n
. nameA l l I n s t a n c e s <−> not not ( exagent
( ag ) and i s
n
. name( ag ) ) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
exn . nameAgents−
n . nameA l l I n s t a n c e s : ex
n . nameAgents (
n
. nameA l l I n s t a n c e s
) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
ex
n
. nameAgents−not : not exagent
( ag ) and ag \ in agents −> not ex
n
. nameAgents
( agents ) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
exn . nameAgents−not : not i s
n . name( ag ) and ag \ in agents −> not ex
n
. nameAgents
( agents ) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
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exn . nameAgents−r e c : ex
n . nameAgents ( ag ’
+ agents ) <−> not not ( exagent ( ag ) and i s
n . name( ag ) and ex
n
. nameAgents
( agents ) ) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
mkn . nameAl l In s tance s−dups : dups (mk
n
. nameA l l I n s t a n c e s ( nats ) ) <−> dups
( nats ) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
mkn . nameAl l In s tance s−in : ag \ in mk
n
. nameA l l I n s t a n c e s ( nats ) <−> not not ( i s
n . name( ag ) and ag
. name \ in nats ) ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
ENDFOREACH




DEFINE generateConnect ion FOR Model
FILE ” connect ion / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
us ing endpoint
connect ion = mk−connect ion ( . . endpoint1 : endpoint ; .
. endpoint2 : endpoint ) ;
v a r i a b l e s
conn , conn0 , conn1 , conn2 , conn3 : connect ion ;
end data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateConnect ions FOR Model
FILE ” connec t i ons / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−




(” i m p l i e s ”) connect ion ; s e t
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) connec t i ons ;
a
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) connect ion ; b
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) connect ion0 ; c
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) connect ion1 ;
s
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) connec t i on s e t ; s0
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) connec t i on s e t0 ; s1
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convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) connec t i on s e t1 ; s2
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) connec t i on s e t2 ;
end a c t u a l i z e
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateConnect ionPreds FOR Model
FILE ” connect ionPreds / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
enr i ch exagent with
p r e d i c a t e s
conn−ok : connect ion ;
va l id−conn : connect ion ;
va l id−conns : connect i ons ;
connected : endpoint
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) connec t i ons ;
connected : agent
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) connec t i ons ;
connect−p o s s i b l e : connect ion
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) connec t i ons ;
v a r i a b l e s
conns , connect i ons : connec t i ons ;
axioms
conn−ok : conn−ok ( conn )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
endpoint−ok ( conn . endpoint1 )
convertSymbol (” and ”) endpoint−ok ( conn
. endpoint2 ) convertSymbol (” and ”) (
FOREACH t h i s . getDeploymentDiagram ( )
. packagedElement . t y p e S e l e c t ( CommunicationPath )
AS a SEPARATOR convertSymbol (” or”)−
a . generateThreatSt r ing ( )
ENDFOREACH−
) ;
va l id−conn : va l id−conn ( conn )
convertSymbol
(” equ iva l en t ”) conn−ok ( conn )
convertSymbol (” and ”)
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)agent
( conn . endpoint1 . agent )
convertSymbol (” and ”)
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”)agent
( conn . endpoint2 . agent ) ;
va l id−conns : va l id−conns ( connect i ons ) <−>
convertSymbol (” a l l ”) conn . conn
convertSymbol
(” in ”) connect i ons −> va l id−conn ( conn ) ;
connected−endpoint−de f : connected
( endp1 , connect i ons )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
(
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”) endp2
. mk−connect ion ( endp1 , endp2 )
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convertSymbol (” in ”) connec t i ons
convertSymbol
(” or ”) mk−connect ion
( endp2 , endp1 )
convertSymbol
(” in ”) connec t i ons ) ;
connected−agent−de f : connected ( ag , connect i ons )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
convertSymbol
(” e x i s t s ”) port




, connect i ons ) ;
connect−p o s s i b l e :
connect−p o s s i b l e ( conn , connect i ons )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)




(” not ”) connected ( conn




(” not ”) connected ( conn
. endpoint2 , connec t i ons )
convertSymbol (” and ”)
( i s s t a t e f u l S e r v i c e ( conn
. endpoint2 . agent )
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”)
convertSymbol
(” not ”) connected ( conn
. endpoint2
. agent , connect i ons ) )
) ;
( : generated axioms : )
va l id−conns−add : va l id−conns
( connect i ons ) and connect−p o s s i b l e
( conn , connect i ons ) −> va l id−conns ( connect i ons +
+ conn ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
va l id−conns−d e l e t e : va l id−conns
( connect i ons ) −> va l id−conns
( connect i ons −− conn ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
end enr i ch
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generatePortsWithNatSort FOR Model
FILE ” por t s / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
enr i ch connect ion with
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cons tant s
LET t h i s . getAllPortNames ( ) AS por t s
FOREACH por t s AS end−
end : nat ;
ENDFOREACH−
axioms
FOREACH por t s AS end−
end :
convertSymbol (” f o l l o w s ”)
end = por t s . indexOf ( end ) + 1 ;
ENDFOREACH−
ENDLET
end enr i ch
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generatePort s FOR Model
FILE ” por t s / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
LET t h i s . getAllPortNames ( ) AS por t s
por t s =




v a r i a b l e s port , port0 , port1 : por t s ;








EXTENSION templates : : g e t t e r
EXTENSION templates : : parse
EXTENSION templates : : deployment
DEFINE Root FOR uml : : Model
EXPAND generateConnectDisconnect FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateSend FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateAsmstep FOR t h i s
EXPAND generate Inputs FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateUser FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateAttacker FOR t h i s
EXPAND g e n e r a t e L i s t s FOR t h i s
IF t h i s . ex i s t sFakeCard l e t ()−
EXPAND generateFakeCardletStep FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateFakeCardletS imple FOR t h i s
ENDIF
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateAsmstep FOR uml : : Model
FILE ”asmstep/ s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”
data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
asm−s tep =
FOREACH t h i s . getAl lSmartcards ( )
AS s c c l a s s−
 s c c l a s s . name−agent−s tep |
ENDFOREACH−
FOREACH t h i s . ge tAl lTermina l s ( )
AS t e r m i n a l c l a s s−
 t e r m i n a l c l a s s . name−agent−s tep |
ENDFOREACH−
FOREACH t h i s . g e t A l l S e r v i c e s ( )
AS s e r v i c e c l a s s −
 s e r v i c e c l a s s . name−agent−s tep |
ENDFOREACH−
IF t h i s . ex i s t sFakeCard l e t ()−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f o r g eab l e−ca rd l e t−agent−s tep |
ENDIF−
connect | d i s connec t | user−agent−s tep | attacker−agent−s tep ;
at tacker−s tep
= attacker−send | attacker−suppres s | attacker−d i s connec t ;
user−s tep = read | send ;
v a r i a b l e s
asm−step , asm−s tep0 : asm−s tep ;
at tacker−step , at tacker−s tep0 : at tacker−s tep ;
user−step , user−s tep0 : user−s tep ;
end data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateFakeCardletStep FOR uml : : Model
FILE ” f a k e c a r d l e t s t e p / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”
data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
fake−ca rd l e t−s tep = generate−re sponse | c a l l−method ;
v a r i a b l e s
fake−ca rd l e t−step , fake−ca rd l e t−s tep0 : fake−ca rd l e t−s tep ;
end data s p e c i f i c a t i o n
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE g e n e r a t e M e s s a g e l i s t S u b l i s t
FOR uml : : Model
FILE ” mes sage l i s t−s u b l i s t / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”
enr i ch m e s s a g e l i s t with
p r e d i c a t e s
. convertSymbol (” uparrow ”) . : m e s s a g e l i s t
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) m e s s a g e l i s t ;
axioms
empty−s u b l i s t :
convertSymbol (” f o l l o w s ”) [ ]
convertSymbol
(” uparrow ”) msgs ; used f o r : s , l s ;
s u b l i s t−bad : convertSymbol (” f o l l o w s ”)
convertSymbol (” not ”) msg ’ + msgs
convertSymbol
(” uparrow ”) [ ] ; used f o r : s , l s ;
s u b l i s t−rec−same−head :
convertSymbol (” f o l l o w s ”) ( ( msg ’
+ msgs
convertSymbol (” uparrow ”) msg ’
+ msgs0 )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
( msgs
convertSymbol
(” uparrow ”) msgs0 )
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) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
s u b l i s t−rec−d i f f e r e n t−head :
convertSymbol (” f o l l o w s ”) (msg
convertSymbol (” unequal ”) msg0 )
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) (msg ’
+ msgs
convertSymbol (” uparrow ”) msg0 ’
+ msgs0
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
(msg ’ + msgs
convertSymbol
(” uparrow ”) msgs0 )
) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
s u b l i s t−member :
msg \ in msgs and msgs \uparrow msgs0 −> msg \ in msgs0 ;
used f o r : s , l s , generated ;
s u b l i s t−rec−d i f f e r e n t−head : |−
( msgs0 \neq [ ] and msg \neq msgs0
. f i r s t ) −> (msg ’
+ msgs \uparrow msgs0 <−> ( ( msg ’
+ msgs ) \uparrow msgs0
. r e s t ) ) ; used f o r : generated ;
s u b l i s t−rec−d i f f e r e n t−head2 : |−
( msgs \neq [ ] and msg0 \neq msgs
. f i r s t ) −> ( msgs \uparrow msg0 ’
+ msgs0 <−>
( msgs \uparrow msgs0 ) ) ; used f o r : generated ;
s u b l i s t−empty : msgs \uparrow [ ] <−> msgs
= [ ] ; used f o r : s , l s , generated ;




FOR uml : : Model
FILE ” ConnectDisconnect / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”
enr i ch Attacker with
p r e d i c a t e s
d i sconnect−p o s s i b l e : connect ion , connect i ons ,
( agent −> por t s −> m e s s a g e l i s t ) ;
connect−p o s s i b l e : connect ion , connect i ons ,
( agent −> por t s −> m e s s a g e l i s t ) ;
procedures
CONNECT : connec t i ons
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) ( agent
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t
) non func t i ona l i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c ;
DISCONNECT : connec t i ons
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) ( agent
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
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convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t
) non func t i ona l i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c ;
v a r i a b l e s
input : por t s
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t ;
inputs : agent
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t ;
axioms
connect−p o s s i b l e−de f : connect−p o s s i b l e
( conn , connect ions , inputs )
<−> connect−p o s s i b l e
( conn , connect i ons ) and
inputs ( conn . endpoint1
. agent ) ( conn . endpoint1
. port ) = [ ] and
inputs ( conn . endpoint2
. agent ) ( conn . endpoint2
. port ) = [ ]
;
d i sconnect−p o s s i b l e−de f : d i sconnect−p o s s i b l e
( conn , connect ions , inputs )
<−> conn \ in connect i ons and
inputs ( conn . endpoint1
. agent ) ( conn . endpoint1
. port ) = [ ] and
inputs ( conn . endpoint2
. agent ) ( conn . endpoint2
. port ) = [ ]
;
va l id−conns−add : va l id−conns
( connect i ons ) and connect−p o s s i b l e
( conn , connect ions , inputs ) −> va l id−conns
( connect i ons +
+ conn ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
d e c l a r a t i o n
CONNECT
: CONNECT ( ; var connect ions , inputs )
{
choose conn
with connect−p o s s i b l e
( conn , connect ions , inputs )
in {
connec t i ons := connect ions +
+ conn ;
( :
i f ( i s s t a t e f u l S e r v i c e ( conn
. endpoint2 . agent ) ) then
{ r e s e t ( conn . endpoint2 . agent ) }
: )




: DISCONNECT ( var connect ions , inputs )
{
choose conn
with d i sconnect−p o s s i b l e
( conn , connect ions , inputs )
in {
connec t i ons :
= connect ions −− conn ;
inputs ( conn . endpoint1
. agent ) ( conn . endpoint1
. port ) := [ ] ;
inputs ( conn . endpoint2
. agent ) ( conn . endpoint2
. port ) := [ ] ;
} i f none sk ip
} ;
end enr i ch
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateSend FOR uml : : Model
FILE ”SEND/ s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”
enr i ch ConnectDisconnect with
procedures
SEND message convertSymbol (” t imes ”) por t s
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) agent
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) connect i ons :
a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t convertSymbol (” t imes ”)
( agentconvertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t )
non func t i ona l i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c ;
v a r i a b l e s
inputs : agent
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t ;
input : por t s
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t ;
a t tacker−known : a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t ;
outport , rem−port : por t s ;
outmsg : message ;
rem−agent : agent ;
d e c l a r a t i o n
SEND
: SEND
( outmsg , outport , ag
, connect i ons ; var attacker−known , inputs )
{
choose conn
with i s−endpoint ( ag
convertSymbol
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(” odot ”) outport , conn )
convertSymbol
(” and ”) conn
convertSymbol
(” in ”) connec t i ons
in l e t rem−agent = other−endpoint
( ag
convertSymbol






) outport , conn )
. port
in {








(” not ”) i s a t t a c k e r
( rem−agent )
then inputs := add
( rem−agent , rem−port , outmsg
, inputs ) ;
} i f none sk ip
} ;
end enr i ch
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generate Inputs FOR uml : : Model
FILE ” inputs / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”
enr i ch mes sage l i s t , connect ionPreds with
f u n c t i o n s
add : agent , ports , message ,
( agent −> por t s −> m e s s a g e l i s t ) −>
( agent −> por t s −> m e s s a g e l i s t
) ; comment
: add message to the end o f the message l i s t
. ;
rem : agent , ports ,
( agent −> por t s −> m e s s a g e l i s t ) −>
( agent −> por t s −> m e s s a g e l i s t
) ; comment
: remove f i r s t message from message l i s t
( u n s p e c i f i e d i f empty ) . ;
p r e d i c a t e s
input−a v a i l a b l e : agent
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convertSymbol (” t imes ”) ( agent
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t ) ;
msgininputs : message
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) ( agent
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t ) ;
v a r i a b l e s
inputs , inputs0 , inputs1 , inputs2 : agent
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t ;
portmsgs , portmsgs0 , portmsgs1
, portmsgs2 : por t s
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t ;
axioms
add−de f : add ( ag , port , msg , inputs ) = inputs ( ag ;
( inputs ( ag ) ( port ; inputs ( ag ) ( port ) + msg ) ) ) ;
rem−de f : rem( ag , port , inputs ) = inputs ( ag ; ( inputs
( ag ) ( port ; inputs ( ag ) ( port ) . r e s t ) ) ) ;
i n p u t a v a i l a b l e : input−a v a i l a b l e ( ag , inputs )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”) port
. inputs ( ag ) ( port )
convertSymbol (” neq ”) [ ] ;
msgininputs : msgininputs (msg , inputs )
convertSymbol (” equ iva l en t ”)
convertSymbol (” e x i s t s ”) ag , port
. msg
convertSymbol (” in ”) inputs ( ag ) ( port ) ;
inputs−i d e n t i t y : inputs ( ag ; inputs
( ag ) ) = inputs ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
inputs−i d e n t i t y : portmsgs ( port ; portmsgs
( port ) ) = portmsgs ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
inputs−i d e n t i t y : portmsgs ( port ) = msgs −> portmsgs
( port ; msgs ) = portmsgs ; used f o r : generated ;
inputs−i d e n t i t y : inputs ( ag ) = portmsgs −> inputs
( ag ; portmsgs ) = inputs ; used f o r : generated ;
inputs−i d e n t i t y : not ag = ag0 −> inputs ( ag ; portmsgs
( port ; msgs ) ) ( ag0 ; inputs ( ag0 ) )
= inputs ( ag ; portmsgs
( port ; msgs )
) ; used f o r
: generated , s
, l s ;
inputs−o v e r r i d e : inputs ( ag ; portmsgs )
( ag ; portmsgs0 ) = inputs
( ag ; portmsgs0 ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
inputs−o v e r r i d e : portmsgs ( port ; msgs )
( port ; msgs0 ) = portmsgs
( port ; msgs0 ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
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inputs−switch : not ag = ag0 −> inputs ( ag ; portmsgs )
( ag0 ; portmsgs0 ) = inputs ( ag0 ; portmsgs0 )
( ag ; portmsgs ) ; used f o r : generated ;
inputs−switch : not port = port0 −> portmsgs
( port ; msgs ) ( port0 ; msgs0 ) = portmsgs
( port0 ; msgs0 ) ( port ; msgs ) ; used f o r : generated ;
msgininputs−add : msgininputs (msg , add
( ag , port , msg , inputs )
) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
msgininputs−not in : not msgininputs
(msg , inputs ) −> not msg \ in inputs ( ag )
( port ) ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
msgininputs−not in : not msgininputs
(msg , inputs ) and msg \ in msgs0 −> not inputs ( ag )
( port ) = msg0 ’
+ msgs0 ; used f o r : generated , s , l s ;
end enr i ch
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateUser FOR uml : : Model
FILE ”USER/ s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”




(” t imes ”) connec t i ons : ( agent
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t
) non func t i ona l i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c ;
USER−SEND agent
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) connec t i ons : a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) ( agent
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t )
non func t i ona l i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c ;
USER agent
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) connec t i ons : a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t
convertSymbol (” t imes ”)( agent
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t )
non func t i ona l i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c ;
v a r i a b l e s
connec t i ons : connect i ons ;
d e c l a r a t i o n
USER−READ : USER−READ( ag , connec t i ons ; inputs )
{
choose port
with connected ( ag
convertSymbol
(” odot ”) port , connect i ons )
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in {
inputs ( ag ) ( port ) := [ ]
} i f none sk ip
} ;
USER−SEND : USER−SEND
( ag , connec t i ons ; var attacker−known , inputs )
{
choose port , msg
with connected ( ag
convertSymbol
(” odot ”) port , connect i ons
) and i s u s e r m e s s a g e (msg)
in SEND
(msg , port , ag
, connect i ons ; at tacker−known , inputs )
i f none sk ip
} ;
USER : USER
( ag , connec t i ons ; at tacker−known , inputs )
{
l e t user−s tep = [ ? ]
in i f user−s tep = send
then USER−SEND
( ag , connec t i ons ; at tacker−known
, inputs )
e l s e i f user−s tep = read
then USER−READ
( ag , connec t i ons ; inputs )
} ;
end enr i ch
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateAttacker FOR uml : : Model
FILE ” Attacker / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”
enr i ch Generate , A t t a c k e r A b i l i t i e s , inputs , asmstep with
procedures
ATTACKER−SEND connect ions
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t :
( agentconvertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t )
non func t i ona l i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c ;
ATTACKER−SUPPRESS connect ions :
( agentconvertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t )
non func t i ona l i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c ;
ATTACKER−DISCONNECT : connect ions ,
( agent −> por t s −> m e s s a g e l i s t )
non func t i ona l i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c ;
ATTACKER connect ions
convertSymbol (” t imes ”) a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t :
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( agent convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t )
non func t i ona l i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c ;
v a r i a b l e s
inputs : agent
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t ;
input : por t s
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t ;
a t tacker−known : a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t ;
d e c l a r a t i o n
ATTACKER−SEND
: ATTACKER−SEND
( connect ions , at tacker−known ; var inputs )
{
choose msg , endp
with attacker−known \ grgr amessage (msg)
and attacker−can−send ( endp , connect i ons )
in inputs ( endp . agent ) ( endp . port ) :=
inputs ( endp . agent ) ( endp . port ) + msg ’
i f none sk ip
} ;
ATTACKER−SUPPRESS
: ATTACKER−SUPPRESS ( connect i ons ; var inputs )
{ choose endp
with attacker−can−suppres s ( endp , connect i ons )
and not inputs ( endp . agent ) ( endp . port ) = [ ]
in inputs := rem( endp . agent , endp
. port , inputs )
i f none sk ip
} ;
ATTACKER−DISCONNECT





) connec t i ons and attacker−can−suppres s
( conn , connect i ons )
in {
connec t i ons :
= connect ions −− conn ;
inputs ( conn . endpoint1
. agent ) ( conn . endpoint1
. port ) := [ ] ;
inputs ( conn . endpoint2
. agent ) ( conn . endpoint2
. port ) := [ ] ;
} i f none sk ip
} ;
ATTACKER
: ATTACKER ( connect ions , at tacker−known ; var inputs )
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{
l e t at tacker−s tep = [ ? ] in
i f a t tacker−s tep = attacker−send
then ATTACKER−SEND
( connect ions , at tacker−known
; inputs
)
e l s e i f a t tacker−s tep
= attacker−suppres s then ATTACKER−SUPPRESS
( connect i ons ; inputs )
e l s e ATTACKER−DISCONNECT
( ; connect ions , inputs ) ;
} ;




FOR uml : : Model
FILE ” FakeCardletSimple / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”
enr i ch inputs , Generate , f a k e c a r d l e t s t e p with
procedures
FAKE−CARDLET−SEND−RESPONSE agent
convertSymbol (” t imes ”)
connec t i ons convertSymbol (” t imes ”) message :
( agent convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t )
non func t i ona l i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c ;
SIMPLE−FAKE−CARDLET agent
convertSymbol
(” t imes ”) connec t i ons : ( agent
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t )
convertSymbol (” t imes ”)
( agent convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t )
non func t i ona l i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c ;
v a r i a b l e s
rem−agent : agent ;
rem−port , l o c a l−port , i npor t : por t s ;
connec t i ons : connec t i ons ;
inputs : agent
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) por t s
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) m e s s a g e l i s t ;
fake−ca rd l e t−known : agent
convertSymbol
(” i m p l i e s ”) a t t a c k e r d a t a s e t ;
d e c l a r a t i o n
FAKE−CARDLET−SEND−RESPONSE
: FAKE−CARDLET−SEND−RESPONSE
( ag , connect ions , msg ; var inputs )




(” in ”) connec t i ons
convertSymbol




) l o c a l−port
, conn )
in {
inputs ( other−endpoint ( ag
convertSymbol
(” odot ”
) l o c a l−port , conn )




) l o c a l−port
, conn ) . port )
:= inputs ( other−endpoint ( ag
convertSymbol
(” odot ”) l o c a l−port , conn )
. agent ) ( other−endpoint ( ag
convertSymbol
(” odot ”
) l o c a l−port , conn )
. port )+ msg ’
} i f none sk ip
} ;
SIMPLE−FAKE−CARDLET
: SIMPLE−FAKE−CARDLET ( ag , connect i ons




i f input−a v a i l a b l e ( ag , inputs )
then choose inpor t
with inputs ( ag ) ( inpor t )
convertSymbol
(” notequa l s ”) [ ]
in {
fake−ca rd l e t−known
( ag ) := fake−ca rd l e t−known( ag )
convertSymbol (” i n t e g r a l ”)
+ inputs ( ag ) ( inpor t ) . f i r s t ;
inputs ( ag ) ( inpor t ) := inputs ( ag )
( inpor t ) . r e s t ;
choose msg
with ( fake−ca rd l e t−known( ag )
convertSymbol
(” grgr ”) amessage (msg ) )
in FAKE−CARDLET−SEND−RESPONSE




end enr i ch
ENDFILE
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE g e n e r a t e L i s t s FOR Model
LET t h i s . g e t L i s t A s s o c i a t i o n s ( ) AS at t s 1
LET getListPropertyofOCLConstra ints ( )
AS at t s 2
LET a t t s 1 . addAll ( a t t s 2 ) AS a t t s
FOREACH a t t s AS a
 l o gg ing (” Ausgabe der L i s t A s s o z i a t i o n e n : ”
+ a )
LET a . type . name AS ty
LET ” l i s t o f ”+ty AS l i t y
LET ” a l i s t o f ”+ty AS l i v a r
FILE l i t y +”/ s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”
a c t u a l i z e l i s t −perm with message by morphism
elem convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
a . type . name ; l i s t
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) l i s t o f
a . type . name ;
a convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
varname ( ty ) ; a0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
varname ( ty )0 ;
b convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
varname ( ty )1 ; c
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
varname ( ty )2 ;
x convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i v a r ; x0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i v a r0 ;
x1 convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i v a r1 ; x2
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i v a r2 ;
y convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i v a r3 ; y0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i v a r4 ;
y1 convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i v a r5 ; y2
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i v a r6 ;
z convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i v a r7 ; z0
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i v a r8 ;
z1 convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
 l i v a r9 ; z2
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)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 l i v a r10 ;
end a c t u a l i z e
ENDFILE
FILE l i t y +”funs / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”
enr i ch  l i t y with
f u n c t i o n s
add :  l i t y , ty −>
 l i t y ;
s i z e :  l i t y −> i n t ;
at :  l i t y , i n t −>
ty ; comment : ze ro based
, u n s p e c i f i e d i f too l a r g e or negat ive . ;
remove :  l i t y , i n t −>
 l i t y ; comment
: remove element at g iven index ( zero based )
. Does nothing i f index i s too l a r g e or negat ive
. ;
remove :  l i t y , ty −>
 l i t y ; comment
: removes only one occurrence , the f i r s t
, o f the g iven element . ;
IF a . type . hasMapKey()−
get :  l i t y ,
a . type . getMapKey ( ) . type
. t rans lateType ( ) −> ty ;
s e t :  l i t y , ty −>
 l i t y ;
ENDIF−
p r e d i c a t e s
hasFree :  l i t y ;
c onta in s :  l i t y , ty ;
IF a . type . hasMapKey()−
containsKey :  l i t y ,
a . type . getMapKey ( ) . type
. t rans lateType ( ) ;
ENDIF−
axioms
hasFree−de f : hasFree ( l i v a r)
IF a . upper > 1 <−> #
 l i v a r < a . upper
ENDIF ; used f o r : s , l s ;
s i z e−de f : s i z e ( l i v a r) = n\ i m p l i e s i (#
 l i v a r ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
conta ins−de f : conta in s ( l i v a r ,
varname ( ty )) <−>
varname ( ty )
convertSymbol (” in ”)
 l i v a r ; used f o r : s , l s ;
at−index : at ( l i v a r , i ) =
 l i v a r [ i \ imp l i e sn
( i
) ] ; used f o r : s , l s ; comment : ze ro based
, u n s p e c i f i e d i f too l a r g e . ;
add−de f : add ( l i v a r ,
78
varname ( ty )) =  l i v a r +
varname ( ty ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
remove−index−ok : 0
convertSymbol (” l e ”) i −> remove (
 l i v a r , i ) =
 l i v a r −1 l i \ imp l i e sn
( i ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
remove−index−negat ive : i < 0 −> remove (
 l i v a r , i ) =
 l i v a r ; used f o r : s , l s ;
remove−element : remove ( l i v a r ,
varname ( ty )) =  l i v a r −1 l
varname
( ty
) ; used f o r : s
, l s ; comment : removes only one occurrence
, the f i r s t . ;
IF a . type . hasMapKey()−
LET a . type . getMapKey ( ) AS k
containsKey−empty : not containsKey ( [ ] ,
k . type . varname4type ( ) ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
containsKey−found :
k . type . varname4type ( ) =
varname ( ty ) .
k . name −> containsKey (
varname ( ty ) ’ +
 l i v a r ,
k . type
. varname4type ( ) ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
containsKey−r e c : not
k . type . varname4type ( ) =
varname ( ty ) .
k . name −> ( containsKey (
varname ( ty ) ’ +
 l i v a r ,
k . type . varname4type ( ))
<−> containsKey (




) ; used f o r : s
, l s ;
get−found : k . type . varname4type ( ) =
varname ( ty ) .k . name −> get (
varname ( ty ) ’ +  l i v a r ,
k . type . varname4type ( )) =
varname ( ty ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
get−r e c : not k . type . varname4type ( ) =
varname ( ty ) .k . name −> get (
varname ( ty ) ’ +  l i v a r ,
k . type . varname4type ( ))




( ) ) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
set−empty : s e t ( [ ] , varname ( ty )) =
varname ( ty ) ’ ; used f o r : s , l s ;
set−found : varname ( ty ) .
k . name = varname ( ty )0 .
k . name −> s e t (
varname ( ty )0 ’ +  l i v a r ,
varname ( ty ))
= varname ( ty ) ’ +
 l i v a r ; used f o r : s , l s ;
set−r e c : not varname ( ty ) .
k . name = varname ( ty )0 .
k . name −> s e t (
varname ( ty )0 ’ +  l i v a r ,
varname ( ty ))
=
varname ( ty )0 ’
+ s e t ( l i v a r ,
varname
( ty )
) ; used f o r : s , l s ;
ENDLET
ENDIF−













EXTENSION templates : : g e t t e r
EXTENSION templates : : parse
DEFINE Root FOR uml : : Model
EXPAND generateFromClassDiagram
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateFromClassDiagram FOR Model
EXPAND generateAccessFuns FOR t h i s
EXPAND generateMessageAccessFuns FOR t h i s
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateAccessFuns FOR Model
LET t h i s . getNormalClasses ( ) AS c l a s s e s
FILE ” a c c e s s f u n s / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”
enr i ch messageacces s funs with
LET c l a s s e s . ownedAttribute AS attg
IF ! a t tg . isEmpty−
f u n c t i o n s
FOREACH attg AS att−
. .at t . name:= . :
at t . c l a s s . name
convertSymbol (” t imes”)−
IF at t . i sCryptoAtt ( )
at t . trans lateCryptoType ( )ELSE−
at t . type . t rans lateType ( )
ENDIF
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”)
at t . c l a s s . name ;
ENDFOREACH
axioms
FOREACH attg AS att−
(at t . c l a s s . varname ( ) .
at t . name:=
at t . t r ans l a t eToVar i ab l e ( )) = mk
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at t . c l a s s . name(
at t . c l a s s
. calculateArgumentsAccessFuns ( a t t ) ) ;
ENDFOREACH
ENDIFENDLET




DEFINE generateMessageAccessFuns FOR Model
LET t h i s . getAllMessageAndUserMessageClasses ( )
AS c l a s s e s
FILE ” messageacces s funs / s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
enr i ch Attacker with
f u n c t i o n s
LET c l a s s e s . ownedAttribute
. removeNameAndTypeDuplicates ( ) AS attg−
FOREACH attg AS att−
. .at t . name:= . : message
convertSymbol (” t imes ”)
IF at t . i sCryptoAtt ( )
at t . trans lateCryptoType ( )
ELSE
at t . type . t rans lateType ( )
ENDIF
convertSymbol




LET c l a s s e s . ownedAttribute AS attg
FOREACH attg AS att−
( i sat t . c l a s s . name(msg)
convertSymbol (” i m p l i e s ”) (msg .
at t . name:=
at t . t r ans l a t eToVar i ab l e ( ) = mk
at t . c l a s s . name(
at t . c l a s s
. calculateArgumentsAccessFuns ( a t t ) ) ) ) ;
ENDFOREACH−
ENDLET−









EXTENSION templates : : g e t t e r
EXTENSION templates : : parse
DEFINE Root FOR uml : : Model
EXPAND generateManualFuns
ENDDEFINE
DEFINE generateManualFuns FOR Model
FILE ”ManualFuns/ s p e c i f i c a t i o n ”−
LET t h i s . getAl lManualOperat ions ( ) AS manops
LET manops . s e l e c t ( o | o . ownedParameter . s e l e c t ( e | e
. d i r e c t i o n . t oS t r i ng ()==” in ” | | e . d i r e c t i o n
. t oS t r i ng ()==” inout ” ) . s i z e == 0) AS cons tant s
LET manops . s e l e c t ( o | o . ownedParameter . s e l e c t ( e | e
. d i r e c t i o n . t oS t r i ng ()==” in ” | | e . d i r e c t i o n
. t oS t r i ng ()==” inout ” ) . s i z e != 0) AS predfuns
LET predfuns . s e l e c t ( e | e . getReturnResult ( ) . type
. t rans lateType () !=” bool ”) AS funs
LET predfuns . s e l e c t ( e | e . getReturnResult ( ) . type
. t rans lateType ()==” bool ”) AS preds
enr i ch message
with
IF cons tant s . s i z e != 0
cons tant s
FOREACH cons tant s AS op−
op . name :
op . getReturnResult ( ) . type
. t rans lateType ( ) ;ENDFOREACH
ENDIF−
IF funs . s i z e != 0
f u n c t i o n s
FOREACH funs AS op−
LET op . getReturnResult ( ) . type . t rans lateType ( )
AS returnType−
op . name :
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FOREACH op . ownedParameter . s e l e c t ( e | e . d i r e c t i o n
. t oS t r i ng ()==” in ” | | e . d i r e c t i o n
. t oS t r i ng ()==” inout ”)
AS inoutParam SEPARATOR ”,”−
inoutParam . type






IF preds . s i z e != 0
p r e d i c a t e s
FOREACH preds AS op−
op . name :
FOREACH op . ownedParameter . s e l e c t ( e | e . d i r e c t i o n
. t oS t r i ng ()==” in ” | | e . d i r e c t i o n
. t oS t r i ng ()==” inout ”)
AS inoutParam SEPARATOR ”,”−
inoutParam . type











Auxiliary Xtend operations for
the deployment diagram
import uml ;
extension templates : : g e t t e r ;
L i s t [ CommunicationPath ] removeTypeDuplicatesCommPath
( L i s t [ CommunicationPath ] l ) :
( ( ! l . isEmpty )
? ( ( l . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . conta in s ( l . f i r s t ( ) ) )
? ( removeTypeDuplicatesCommPath ( l . w i thoutF i r s t
( ) ) ) : ( removeTypeDuplicatesCommPath
( l . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) ) . add ( l . f i r s t ( ) ) ) ) :
({} ) ) ;
cached Boolean ex i s t sFakeCard l e t ( Model mo) :
(mo. getAl lNodes ( ) . e x i s t s ( e | e . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : f o r g e a b l e ” ) ) ) ;
L i s t [ Node ] getAl lNodes ( Model m) :
m. getDeploymentDiagram ( ) . packagedElement . t y p eS e l e c t
(Node ) ;
L i s t [ S t r ing ] t o I n p o r t S t r i n g s ( L i s t [ Property ] p) :
(p . isEmpty )
? ({} ) : ({” inpor t = ” + p . f i r s t ( ) . name } . addAll
(p . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . t o I n p o r t S t r i n g s ( ) ) ) ;
S t r ing t o I n p o r t S t r i n g ( L i s t [ S t r ing ] l ) :
( l . isEmpty )
? ( ” ” ) : ( l . f i r s t ( ) + ( ( l . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . isEmpty )
? ( ” ” ) : ( ” ” + convertSymbol
(” or ”) + ” ” + l . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . t o I n p o r t S t r i n g
( ) ) ) ) ;
L i s t [ S t r ing ] getTerminalPorts
( uml : : Model m, Class t e r m i n a l c l a s s ) :
l et termina lnodes = m. getDeploymentDiagram
( ) . packagedElement . t y pe S e l e c t (Node ) . s e l e c t
( e | e . hasStereotype
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(”SecureMDD : : Terminal ”) && e . name
== t e r m i n a l c l a s s . name) :
termina lnodes . getPort s ( ) . t o I n p o r t S t r i n g s ( ) ;
L i s t [ S t r ing ] ge tCard l e tPor t s
( uml : : Model m, Class s c c l a s s ) :
l et ca rd l e tnode s = m. getDeploymentDiagram
( ) . packagedElement . t y pe S e l e c t (Node ) . s e l e c t
( e | e . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : Smartcard ”) && e . name
== s c c l a s s . name) :
ca rd l e tnode s . ge tPort s ( ) . t o I n p o r t S t r i n g s ( ) ;
L i s t [ S t r ing ] g e t S e r v i c e P o r t s
( uml : : Model m, Class s e r v i c e c l a s s ) :
l et s e r v i c e n o d e s = m. getDeploymentDiagram
( ) . packagedElement . t y pe S e l e c t (Node ) . s e l e c t
( e | e . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : S e r v i c e ”) && e . name
== s e r v i c e c l a s s . name) :
s e r v i c e n o d e s . getPort s ( ) . t o I n p o r t S t r i n g s ( ) ;
L i s t [ Property ] getPort s ( L i s t [ Node ] nodes ) :
nodes . getCommunicationPaths
( ) . removeTypeDuplicatesCommPath
( ) . memberEnd . f l a t t e n ( ) ;
Property getPort (Node n , CommunicationPath cp ) :
(n . getPort s ( ) . s e l e c t ( e | e . a s s o c i a t i o n == cp ) . f i r s t ( ) ) ;
L i s t [ Property ] getPort s (Node n) :
n . getCommunicationPaths
( ) . removeTypeDuplicatesCommPath ( ) . memberEnd . s e l e c t
( e | e . type . name!=n . name ) ;
S t r ing portNameWithClass ( Property p) :
( p . oppos i t e . type . name + ”2” + p . type
. name + ” DefaultPort ” ) ;
private St r ing portNameWithNodeName( Property p) :
l et s1 = p . getOtherEnd ( ) . type . name :
l et s2 = p . type . name :
( s1 + ”2” + s2 + ” DefaultPort ” ) ;
S t r ing portName ( Property p) : ( ! ( p . name
== null | | p . name
== ”” ) ? p . name : p . portNameWithNodeName ( ) ) ;
L i s t [ S t r ing ] portNames (Node n) :
n . getPort s ( ) . portName ( ) . removeDupl icates ( ) ;
L i s t [ S t r ing ] getAllPortNames ( Model m) :
m. getAl lNodes ( ) . getPort s ( ) . portName
( ) . removeDupl icates ( ) ;
S t r ing getAnyPort
( S t r ing component1 , S t r ing component2 , Model m) :
m. getDeploymentDiagram ( ) . getNode
86
( component1 ) . g e t A s s o c i a t i o n s ( ) . t y p e S e l e c t
( CommunicationPath ) . removeTypeDuplicatesCommPath
( ) . memberEnd . s e l e c t ( e | e . c l a s s . name
== component2 ) . oppos i t e . f i r s t ( ) . name ;
S t r ing getAnyPortSend
( St r ing component1 , S t r ing component2 , Model m) :
m. getDeploymentDiagram ( ) . getNode
( component1 ) . g e t A s s o c i a t i o n s ( ) . t y p e S e l e c t
( CommunicationPath ) . removeTypeDuplicatesCommPath
( ) . memberEnd . s e l e c t ( e | e . c l a s s . name
== component2 ) . f i r s t ( ) . name ;
Node getNode ( Package depl , S t r ing nodename ) :
( depl . packagedElement . t y pe S e l e c t (Node ) . s e l e c t





S t r ing convertSymbol
( S t r ing symbolname ) : JAVA swt . KIVSymbolConverter
. convertSymbol ( java . lang . S t r ing ) ;
L i s t [ Property ] getListPropertyofOCLConstra ints
( ) : JAVA swt . Parser . getListPropertyofOCLConstra ints
( ) ;
S t r ing toLower ( S t r ing s ) : JAVA swt . U t i l . getLower
( java . lang . S t r ing ) ;
S t r ing toFirstLower
( S t r ing s ) : JAVA swt . U t i l . getFi r s tLower
( java . lang . S t r ing ) ;
Void l ogg ing ( S t r ing s ) : JAVA swt . U t i l . l o gg ing
( java . lang . S t r ing ) ;
Void debug ( St r ing s ) : JAVA swt . U t i l . debug
( java . lang . S t r ing ) ;
S t r ing ppList ( L i s t [ S t r ing ] s t r s , S t r ing between ) :
( s t r s . s i z e == 0 ? ”” :
( s t r s . s i z e == 1 ? s t r s . f i r s t ( ) :
s t r s . f i r s t ( ) + between + ppList ( s t r s . w i thoutF i r s t
( ) , between )
) ) ;
S t r ing getSecond ( L i s t [ S t r ing ] l s ) :
l s . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . f i r s t ( ) ;
L i s t [ Class ] ge tAl lMessageClas se s ( Model mo) :
mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . s e l e c t ( c |
( ! c . i sAbs t r a c t ) && c . i sMessage ( ) ) ;
L i s t [ Class ] getAllMessageAndUserMessageClasses
( Model mo) :
mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . s e l e c t ( c |
( ! c . i sAbs t r a c t ) && ( c . i sMessage ( )
| | c . i sUserMessage ( ) ) ) ;
L i s t [ Class ] getAl lUserMessageClasses ( Model mo) :
mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . s e l e c t ( e | e . i sUserMessage
( ) && ! e . i sAbs t r a c t ) ;
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Boolean o n l y T r i v i a l U s e r C l a s s e s ( Model mo) :
( l et cs = mo. getAl lUserMessageClasses ( ) :
c s . f o r A l l ( c | c . ownedAttribute . f o r A l l
( a | a . type . name == ”Number”
| | a . type . name == ” St r ing ”
| | a . type . name == ” Boolean ” ) ) ) ;
Package getClassDiagram ( Model m) :
m. packagedElement . t y p e Se l e c t ( Package ) . s e l e c t
( e | e . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : ClassDiagram ” ) ) . f i r s t ( ) ;
cached Package getSecur i tyDatatypes ( Model m) :
m. packagedElement . t y p e Se l e c t ( Package ) . s e l e c t
( e | e . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : Secur i tyDatatypes ” ) ) ;
cached L i s t [ Class ] getClassDiagramClasses ( Model m) :
m. getClassDiagram ( ) . ownedElement . t y pe S e l e c t ( Class ) ;
cached L i s t [ Enumeration ] getClassDiagramEnumerations
( Model m) :
m. getClassDiagram ( ) . ownedElement . t y pe S e l e c t
( Enumeration ) ;
cached L i s t [ Class ] g e tSecur i tyData type sC la s s e s
( Model m) :
m. getSecur i tyDatatypes ( ) . ownedElement . t y p e S e l e c t
( Class ) ;
Class ge tC la s s
( Model m, St r ing n) : m. getClassDiagramClasses
( ) . s e l e c t ( c | c . name==n ) . f i r s t ( ) ;
cached Package getDeploymentDiagram ( Model m) :
m. packagedElement . t y p e Se l e c t ( Package ) . s e l e c t
( e | e . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : DeploymentDiagram ” ) ) . f i r s t ( ) ;
cached Property ge tS ta t eAt t r i bu t e ( Class this ) :
this . ownedAttribute . s e l e c t F i r s t ( a | a . i s S t a t e A t t r i b u t e
( ) ) ;
L i s t [ Operation ] in s tanceOperat i ons ( Class this ) :
this . ownedOperation ;
Boolean hasConstructor ( Class this ) :
( l et ops = this . i n s tanceOperat i ons ( ) :
ops . e x i s t s ( op | op . name == this . name ) ) ;
Operation getConstructor ( Class this ) :
( l et ops = this . i n s tanceOperat i ons ( ) :
ops . s e l e c t F i r s t ( op | op . name == this . name)
) ;
cached L i s t [ Property ] ge tAtt r ibute s InCorrec tOrder
( Class this ) :
( this . hasConstructor ( )
? this . getAttr ibutesFromConstructor
( ) : this . getGenera l ( ) . g e t A l l A t t r i b u t e s ( ) . addAll
( this . i n s t a n c e A t t r i b u t e s ( ) ) ) ;
L i s t [ Property ] in s tanceAtt r ibute sFromAssoc ia t i on
( Class this ) :
this . ownedAttribute . s e l e c t ( e | e . a s s o c i a t i o n != null ) ;
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L i s t [ Property ] in s tanceAtt r ibute sWithoutAssoc ia t i on
( Class this ) :
this . ownedAttribute . s e l e c t ( e | e . a s s o c i a t i o n == null ) ;
L i s t [ Property ] i n s t a n c e A t t r i b u t e s ( Class this ) :
this . i n s tanceAtt r ibute sWithoutAssoc ia t i on ( ) . addAll
( this . i n s tanceAtt r ibute sFromAssoc ia t i on ( ) ) ;
L i s t [ Property ] getAttr ibutesFromConstructor
( Class this ) :
( l et op = this . ge tConstructor ( ) :
( l et params = op . ownedParameter :
params . c o l l e c t (p | this . getAttributeWithName (p . name ) )
) ) ;
Property getAttributeWithName ( Class this , S t r ing n) :
this . ownedAttribute . s e l e c t F i r s t ( a | a . name == n ) ;
L i s t [ S t r ing ] removeDupl icates ( L i s t [ S t r ing ] l ) :
( l . isEmpty )
?( l ) : ( ( l . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . conta in s ( l . f i r s t ( ) )
?( l . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . removeDupl icates ( ) ) : ( { l . f i r s t
( ) } . addAll ( l . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . removeDupl icates
( ) ) ) ) ) ;
L i s t [ Property ] removeNameAndTypeDuplicates
( L i s t [ Property ] l ) :
( ( ! l . isEmpty )
? ( ( l . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . typeAndNameContains ( l . f i r s t
( ) ) )
? ( removeNameAndTypeDuplicates
( l . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) ) ) :
( removeNameAndTypeDuplicates
( l . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) ) . add ( l . f i r s t
( ) ) ) )
: ({} ) ) ;
L i s t [ Property ] removeTypeDuplicates ( L i s t [ Property ] l ) :
( ( ! l . isEmpty )
? ( ( l . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . typeContains ( l . f i r s t ( ) ) )
? ( removeTypeDuplicates ( l . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) ) ) :
( removeTypeDuplicates ( l . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) ) . add
( l . f i r s t ( ) ) ) ) : ({} ) ) ;
Boolean typeAndNameContains
( L i s t [ Property ] l , Property p) :
l . isEmpty ? fa l se : ( ( l . f i r s t ( ) . name
== p . name) && ( l . f i r s t ( ) . trans lateCryptoType ( )
== p . trans lateCryptoType ( ) ) ? true :
l . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . typeAndNameContains (p ) ) ;
Boolean typeContains ( L i s t [ Property ] l , Property p) :
JAVA swt . U t i l . typeContains
( java . u t i l . L i s t , org . e c l i p s e . uml2 . uml . Property ) ;
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L i s t [ Property ] c a l c L i s t A c t u a l i z a t i o n s ( L i s t [ Class ] l ) :
( l et a t t s = ( L i s t [ Property ] ) ( l . c o l l e c t
( c | c . ownedAttribute ) . f l a t t e n ( ) ) :
a t t s . s e l e c t ( a | ! a . i sPr imit iveType
( ) && ! a . i sPr im i t i v eTypeL i s t ( ) && a . i s L i s t
( ) ) . removeTypeDuplicates ( ) ) ;
S t r ing getMK( Class c ) :
l et a t t c = c . ge tAtt r ibute s InCorrec tOrder ( ) :
(”mk” + c . name+(( a t t c . isEmpty )
?(””) : (” (”+ at t c . generateArgumentStr ing ( ) +”)”))) ;
S t r ing generateArgumentStr ing ( L i s t [ Property ] lp ) :
l et newnams = lp . ge tUn iqueVar iab l e s4Proper t i e s ( ) :
newnams . ppList (” , ” ) ;
L i s t [ S t r ing ] ge tUn iqueVar iab l e s4Proper t i e s
( L i s t [ Property ] lp ) :
l et nams = lp . t rans l a t eToVar i ab l e ( ) : nams . makeUnique
( ) ;
L i s t [ S t r ing ] makeUnique
( L i s t [ S t r ing ] todo ) : todo . makeUniqueRec ( { } ) ;
L i s t [ S t r ing ] makeUniqueRec
( L i s t [ S t r ing ] todo , L i s t [ S t r ing ] done ) :
( todo . isEmpty ? done :
( l et s = todo . f i r s t ( ) :
( l et news = ( done . conta in s ( s )
? s . newName(0 , done ) : s ) :
( todo . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . makeUniqueRec (
( L i s t [ S t r ing ] ) done . add ( news ) )
) ) ) ) ;
S t r ing newName( St r ing s , I n t e g e r c , L i s t [ S t r ing ] l i ) :
( l i . c onta in s ( s + c ) ? s . newName( c + 1 , l i ) : s + c ) ;
L i s t [ S t r ing ] r e v e r s e ( L i s t [ S t r ing ] l i ) :
l i . isEmpty
? {} : l i . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . r e v e r s e ( ) . add ( l i . f i r s t ( ) ) ;
S t r ing calculateArgumentsAccessFuns
( Class c , Property at t ) :
l et a l l a t t s = c . ge tAtt r ibute s InCorrec tOrder ( ) :
( ( a l l a t t s . isEmpty )
? ( ” ” ) : ( a l l a t t s . c a l c A r g S t r i n g L i s t ( c , a t t ) ) ) ;
S t r ing c a l c A r g S t r i n g L i s t
( L i s t [ Property ] at t s , Class c , Property at t ) :
( ( a t t s . isEmpty )
? ( ” ” ) : ( a t t s . f i r s t ( ) . ca l cArgSt r ing ( c , a t t ) + (
( a t t s . w i thoutF i r s t ( ) . isEmpty )
? ( ” ” ) : ( ” , ” + a t t s . w i thoutF i r s t
( ) . c a l c A r g S t r i n g L i s t ( c , a t t ) ) ) ) ) ;
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St r ing ca l cArgSt r ing
( Property atts , Class c , Property at t ) :
( a t t s . name
== att . name)
?( a t t . t r ans l a t eToVar i ab l e ( ) ) : ( c a l c C l a s s I n s t a n c e
( c ) + ” .” + a t t s . name ) ;
S t r ing c a l c C l a s s I n s t a n c e ( Class c ) :
( ( c . i sMessage ( )
| | c . i sUserMessage ( ) ) ? ”msg” : c . varname ( ) ) ;
Boolean isCryptoAtt ( Property p) :
(p . type . name == ”Nonce” | |
p . type . name == ” Sec r e t ” | |
p . type . name == ”Key” | |
p . type . name == ”SymmKey” | |
p . type . name == ” PrivateKey ” | |
p . type . name == ”PublicKey” | |
p . type . name == ”SignedData” | |
p . type . name == ”HashedData” | |
p . type . name == ”MACData” | |
p . type . name == ”EncData” | |
p . type . name == ”EncDataSymm” | |
p . type . name == ”EncDataAsymm” | |
p . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : hashed ”) | |
p . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : s igned ”) | |
p . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : encrypted ”) | |
p . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : encryptedAsymm ”)
) ;
S t r ing WRAP( Class c ) : ”wrap”+c . name ;
S t r ing WRAP2
( Class c , S t r ing s ) : ”wrap”+c . name + ”2” + s ;
S t r ing WRAP2
(Type ty , S t r ing s ) : ”wrap”+ty . name + ”2” + s ;
S t r ing WRAP2
( St r ing s t r , S t r ing s ) : ”wrap”+s t r + ”2” + s ;
S t r ing getArguments ( Class c ) :
l et attg = c . ge tAtt r ibute s InCorrec tOrder ( ) :
( a t tg . isEmpty
? ”” : ”(” + attg . getArgumentString ( ) + ” ) ” ) ;
S t r ing getArgumentString ( Property p) :
” . . ” + p . name + ” : ” + (p . hasHashedStereotype ( )
? ”HashedData” :
(p . hasEncryptedStereotype ( ) ? ”EncData” :
(p . hasEncryptedAsymmStereotype ( ) ? ”EncDataAsymm” :
(p . hasS ignedStereotype ( ) ? ”SignedData” :
p . t rans lateType ( ) ) ) ) ) ;
S t r ing getArgumentString ( L i s t [ Property ] ps ) : ppList
( ps . c o l l e c t (p | p . getArgumentString ( ) ) , ” ; ” ) ;
L i s t [ Property ] g e t L i s t A s s o c i a t i o n s ( Model m) :
l et c l a s s e s = m. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) :
c l a s s e s . g e t L i s t A s s o c i a t i o n s 4 ( ) ;
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L i s t [ Property ] g e t L i s t A s s o c i a t i o n s 4 ( L i s t [ Class ] c s ) :
( c s . c o l l e c t ( e | e . g e t L i s t A s s o c i a t i o n s 3 ( ) ) . f l a t t e n ( ) ) ;
L i s t [ Property ] g e t L i s t A s s o c i a t i o n s 2 ( L i s t [ Class ] c s ) :
( c s . s i z e == 0 ? { } :
( l et c = cs . f i r s t ( ) : c s . w i thoutF i r s t
( ) . g e t L i s t A s s o c i a t i o n s 2 ( ) . addAll
( c . g e t L i s t A s s o c i a t i o n s 3 ( ) ) ) ) ;
L i s t [ Property ] g e t L i s t A s s o c i a t i o n s 3 ( Class c ) :
( l et a t t s = c . ownedAttribute : a t t s . s e l e c t
( a | a . upper != 1 ) ) ;
cached L i s t [ Operation ] getAl lManualOperat ions
( Model mo) :
mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . ownedOperation . s e l e c t
( e | e . hasManualStereotype ( ) ) ;
cached L i s t [ Ac t i v i ty ] g e t A l l A c t i v i t i e s ( Model m) :
m. ownedElement . t y p e Se l e c t ( Package )
. s e l e c t ( e | e . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : ActivityDiagram ”) )
. ownedElement . t y p e S e l e c t ( Ac t i v i ty ) ;
cached L i s t [ Enumeration ] getAl lEnumerat ions ( Model m) :
m. getClassDiagram ( ) . packagedElement . t y pe S e l e c t
( Enumeration ) ;
cached L i s t [ Class ] getAl lTermina l s ( Model m) :
(m. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . s e l e c t ( e | e . i sTermina l
( ) && ! e . i sAbs t r a c t ) ) ;
cached L i s t [ Class ] getAl lSmartcards ( Model m) :
(m. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . s e l e c t ( e | e . isSmartCard
( ) && ! e . i sAbs t r a c t ) ) ;
cached L i s t [ Class ] g e t A l l S e r v i c e s ( Model m) :
(m. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . s e l e c t ( e | e . i s S e r v i c e
( ) && ! e . i sAbs t r a c t ) ) ;
cached L i s t [ Class ] g e tA l lUse r s ( Model m) :
(m. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . s e l e c t ( e | e . i sUse r
( ) && ! e . i sAbs t r a c t ) ) ;
cached L i s t [ Class ] getAl lConstants ( Model m) :
m. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . s e l e c t ( e | e . i sConstant s ( ) ) ;
cached L i s t [ Class ] getNormalClasses ( Model m) :
m. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . s e l e c t ( c | c . i sNormalClass
( ) ) ;
cached L i s t [ Class ] getUsermessages ( Model mo) :
mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . s e l e c t
( e | e . hasUsermessageStereotype ( ) ) ;
cached L i s t [ Class ] g e t P l a i n C l a s s e s ( Model mo) :
mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . s e l e c t
( e | e . hasPla inDataStereotype ( ) ) ;
cached L i s t [ Class ] getHashClasses ( Model mo) :
mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . s e l e c t
( e | e . hasHashDataStereotype ( ) ) ;
cached L i s t [ Class ] g e tS i gnC la s s e s ( Model mo) :
mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . s e l e c t
( e | e . hasSignDataStereotype ( ) ) ;
L i s t [ Class ] getGenera l ( C l a s s i f i e r this ) : this . g ene ra l ;
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Boolean isNormalClass ( Class c ) :
( ! c . isSmartCard ( ) ) &&
( ! c . i sTermina l ( ) ) &&
( ! c . i s S e r v i c e ( ) ) &&
( ! c . i sUse r ( ) ) &&
( ! c . i sMessage ( ) ) &&
( ! c . i sUserMessage ( ) ) &&
( ! c . i sConstant s ( ) ) &&
( ! c . hasManualStereotype ( ) ) &&
( ! c . isEnumeration ( ) ) ;
Boolean isEnumeration ( Class c ) : c . metaType
== Enumeration ;
Boolean i sConstant s ( Class this ) :
this . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : Constant ” ) ;
Boolean isSmartCard ( Class this ) :
this . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : Smartcard ”) | |
this . g ene ra l . t y p e S e l e c t ( Class ) . e x i s t s
( c | c . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : Smartcard ” ) ) ;
Boolean i sTermina l ( Class this ) :
this . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : Terminal ”) | |
this . g ene ra l . t y p e S e l e c t ( Class ) . e x i s t s
( c | c . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : Terminal ” ) ) ;
Boolean i s S e r v i c e ( Class this ) :
this . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : S e r v i c e ”) | |
this . g ene ra l . t y p e S e l e c t ( Class ) . e x i s t s
( c | c . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : S e r v i c e ” ) ) ;
Boolean isMessage ( Class this ) :
this . hasMessageStereotype ( ) | |
this . g ene ra l . t y p e S e l e c t ( Class ) . e x i s t s
( c | c . hasMessageStereotype ( ) ) ;
Boolean isUserMessage ( Class this ) :
this . hasUsermessageStereotype ( ) | |
this . g ene ra l . t y p e S e l e c t ( Class ) . e x i s t s
( c | c . hasUsermessageStereotype ( ) ) ;
Boolean i sP la inData ( Class this ) :
this . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : PlainData ” ) ;
Boolean i sFakeCard le t ( Class this ) :
this . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : f o r g e a b l e ” ) ;
Boolean i sUse r ( Class this ) :
this . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : User ” ) ;
Boolean isS ignData ( Class this ) :
this . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : SignData ” ) ;
Boolean i s L i s t ( Property p) : p . upper > 1 ;
Boolean i s S t a t e A t t r i b u t e ( Property a ) :
a . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : s t a t u s ” ) ;
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Boolean isHashed ( Property this ) :
this . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : hashed ” ) ;
Boolean isEncrypted ( Property this ) :
this . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : encrypted ” ) ;
Boolean isEncryptedAsymm ( Property this ) :
this . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : encryptedAsymm ” ) ;
Boolean i sS i gned ( Property this ) :
this . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : s igned ” ) ;
Boolean i sSecur i tyDatatype ( Class this ) :
this . package . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : Secur i tyDatatypes ” ) ;
Boolean i sSecur i tyDatatype (Type this ) :
( this . metaType
== Class && ( ( Class ) this ) . i sSecur i tyDatatype ( ) ) ;
Boolean i s S t a t e f u l ( Class s e r v e r ) :
l et s t e r eo type=s e r v e r . ge tAppl i edStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : S e r v i c e ” ) :
s t e r eo type
==null
? s e r v e r . i s G e n e r a l S t a t e f u l ( ) :
( l et b= s e r v e r . getValue ( s te reotype , ” s t a t e f u l ” ) :
b==true ? true : s e r v e r . i s G e n e r a l S t a t e f u l ( ) ) ;
Boolean i s G e n e r a l S t a t e f u l ( Class s e r v e r ) :
l et gStereotype=s e r v e r . ge tGenera lServer
( ) . ge tAppl i edStereotype (”SecureMDD : : S e r v i c e ” ) :
gStereotype
==null
? fa l se : ( l et b= s e r v e r . ge tGenera lServer
( ) . getValue ( gStereotype , ” s t a t e f u l ” ) :
b==true ? true : fa l se ) ;
Class getGenera lServer ( C l a s s i f i e r this ) :
this . getGenera l ( ) . s e l e c t ( e | e . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : S e r v i c e ” ) ) . f i r s t ( ) ;
Boolean cons tant sEx i s t ( Model m) :
m. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . e x i s t s ( e | e . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : Constant ” ) ) ;
Boolean s t a t u s E x i s t s ( Model m) :
l et c l a s = m. getAl lSmartcards ( ) . addAll
(m. getAl lTermina l s ( ) ) . addAll (m. g e t A l l S e r v i c e s ( ) ) :
c l a s . ownedAttribute . e x i s t s ( e | e . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : s t a t u s ” ) ) ;
L i s t [ Property ] g e t C e r t i f i c a t e A t t r i b u t e s ( Class c ) :
( l et certData = ( Class ) ( c . ownedAttribute . f i r s t
( ) . type ) :
certData . ge tAtt r ibute s InCorrec tOrder ( )
) ;
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Property g e t C e r t i f i c a t e S i g n a t u r e A t t r i b u t e ( Class c ) :
( c . ownedAttribute . f i r s t ( ) . hasS ignedStereotype ( )
? c . ownedAttribute . f i r s t
( ) : c . ownedAttribute . getSecond ( ) ) ;
Property g e t C e r t i f i c a t e D a t a A t t r i b u t e ( Class c ) :
( c . ownedAttribute . f i r s t ( ) . hasS ignedStereotype ( )
? c . ownedAttribute . getSecond
( ) : c . ownedAttribute . f i r s t ( ) ) ;
Class g e t C e r t i f i c a t e D a t a C l a s s ( Class c ) : ( Class )
( c . ownedAttribute . f i r s t ( ) . type ) ;
S t r ing toS t r i ng ( uml : : S t r ing this ) :
this ;
S t r ing translateTypeToSpecName ( St r ing s ) :
( s == ”Number” ? ” int−pa i r ” :
( s == ” St r ing ” ? ” s t r i ng−data ” :
( s == ” Boolean ” ? ” bool ” :
( ( s == ”SymmKey” | | s == ”PublicKey” | | s
== ” PrivateKey ” | | s == ”EncDataSymm” | | s
== ”EncDataAsymm” | | s == ”SignedData” | | s
== ”HashedData” )? ” Secur i tyOperat ions ” :
( s == ” Sec r e t ” ? ” Sec r e t ” :
( s == ”Nonce” ? ”Nonce” :
” data ” ) ) ) ) ) ) ;
S t r ing trans lateCryptoType ( Property p) :
( ( p . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : hashed ”) )
?(” HashedData ” ) :
( ( p . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : s igned ”) )
?(” SignedData ” ) :
( ( p . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : encrypted ”) )
?(” EncData ” ) :
( ( p . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : encryptedAsymm ”))
?(”EncDataAsymm ” ) :
( ( p . type . name == ”EncDataSymm”)? ”EnData” :
( ( p . type . name == ”EncDataAsymm”)? ”EncDataAsymm” :
t rans lateType (p ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ;
S t r ing trans lateType ( St r ing s ) :
( s == ”Number” ? ” i n t ” :
( s == ” St r ing ” ? ” s t r i n g ” :
( s == ” Boolean ” ? ” bool ” :
s ) ) ) ;
S t r ing trans lateType (Type this ) :
l et n = this . name : n . t rans lateType ( ) ;
S t r ing trans lateType ( Property this ) :
l et n = this . type . name :
l et ty1 = trans lateType (n) :
l et r e s t = ( this . i s L i s t ( ) ? ” l i s t o f ” : ””) :
r e s t + ty1
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;
Boolean i sPr imit iveType
( Property this ) : this . type . i sPr imit iveType ( ) ;
Boolean i sPr imit iveType
(Type this ) : this . name . i sPr imit iveType ( ) ;
Boolean i sPr imit iveType ( St r ing ty ) :
ty == ”Number” | | ty == ” St r ing ” | | ty
== ” Boolean ” ;
Boolean i sPr im i t i v eTypeL i s t ( Property p) :
( l et t = p . t rans lateType ( ) : ( t == ” i n t l i s t ” | | t
== ” s t r i n g l i s t ” | | t == ” b o o l l i s t ”) ) ;
S t r ing varname ( NamedElement this ) : varname ( this . name ) ;
S t r ing varname ( St r ing this ) : ” a ” + this ;
S t r ing varname4type ( S t r ing s ) :
( s == ” i n t ”) ? ” i ” :
( ( s == ” nat ”)? ”n” :
( ( s == ” s t r i n g ”)? ” s t r ” :
( ( s == ” bool ”)? ” boo lvar ” : varname ( s ) ) ) ) ;
S t r ing varname4type (Type ty ) : varname4type
( ty . t rans lateType ( ) ) ;
S t r ing t rans l a t eToVar i ab l e ( Property p) :
(p . t rans lateType ( ) == ” i n t ”)?(” i ” ) :
( ( p . t rans lateType ( ) == ” nat ”)?(” n ” ) :
( ( p . t rans lateType ( ) == ” s t r i n g ”)?(” s t r ” ) :
( ( p . t rans lateType ( ) == ” bool ”)?(” boo lvar ” ) :
( ( p . hasHashedStereotype ( ) ) ? ( varname (” HashedData ” ) ) :
( ( p . hasEncryptedStereotype ( ) ) ? ( varname (” EncData ” ) ) :
( ( p . hasEncryptedAsymmStereotype ( ) )
?( varname (”EncDataAsymm ” ) ) :
( ( p . hasS ignedStereotype ( ) )
?( varname (” SignedData ” ) ) : ( varname (p . t rans lateType
( ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ;
Boolean h a s S t a t i c A t t r i b u t e s ( Class this ) :
this . i sConstant s ( ) ;
Boolean hasPla inDataStereotype ( Element e ) :
e . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : PlainData ” ) ;
Boolean hasHashDataStereotype ( Element e ) :
e . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : HashData ” ) ;
Boolean hasUsermessageStereotype ( Element e ) :
e . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : Usermessage ” ) ;
Boolean hasMessageStereotype ( Element e ) :
e . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : Message ” ) ;
Boolean hasSignDataStereotype ( Element e ) :
e . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : SignData ” ) ;
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Boolean hasHashedStereotype ( Element e ) :
e . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : hashed ” ) ;
Boolean hasS ignedStereotype ( Element e ) :
e . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : s igned ” ) ;
Boolean hasEncryptedStereotype ( Element e ) :
e . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : encrypted ” ) ;
Boolean hasEncryptedAsymmStereotype ( Element e ) :
e . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : encryptedAsymm ” ) ;
Boolean hasManualStereotype ( Element e ) :
e . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : Manual ” ) ;
Boolean h a s C e r t i f i c a t e S t e r e o t y p e ( Class c ) :
c . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : C e r t i f i c a t e ” ) ;
Boolean e x i s t s S t e r e o t y p e
( L i s t [ Class ] c l a s s e s , S t r ing stereotypename ) :
( c l a s s e s . e x i s t s ( c | c . ge tAppl i edStereotype
( stereotypename ) != null ) ) ;
Boolean hasStereotype ( Element this , S t r ing s ) :
this . g e tAppl i edStereotype ( s )!= null ;
cached Boolean ex i s t sNonce ( Model mo) :
(mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . ownedAttribute . e x i s t s
( e | e . type != null && e . type . name == ”Nonce ” ) ) ;
cached Boolean e x i s t s S e c r e t ( Model mo) :
(mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . ownedAttribute . e x i s t s
( e | e . type != null && e . type . name == ” Sec r e t ” ) ) ;
cached Boolean existsSymmKey ( Model mo) :
(mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . ownedAttribute . e x i s t s
( e | e . type != null && e . type . name == ”SymmKey” ) ) ;
cached Boolean existsASymmKey ( Model mo) :
(mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . ownedAttribute . e x i s t s
( e | e . type != null && ( e . type . name
== ”PublicKey” | | e . type . name == ” PrivateKey ” ) ) ) ;
cached Boolean usesEncrypt ion ( Model mo) :
(mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . ownedAttribute . e x i s t s
( e | e . hasEncryptedStereotype ( ) ) ) ;
cached Boolean usesAsymmEncryption ( Model mo) :
(mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . ownedAttribute . e x i s t s
( e | e . hasEncryptedAsymmStereotype ( ) ) ) ;
cached Boolean usesHashing ( Model mo) :
(mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . ownedAttribute . e x i s t s
( e | e . hasHashedStereotype ( ) ) ) ;
cached Boolean use sS i gn ing ( Model mo) :
(mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . ownedAttribute . e x i s t s
( e | e . hasS ignedStereotype ( ) ) ) ;
cached Boolean usesSymmKey
( Model mo) : mo. usesEncrypt ion ( )
| | mo. existsSymmKey ( ) ;
cached Boolean usesASymmKey
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( Model mo) : mo. usesAsymmEncryption ( )
| | mo. existsASymmKey ( ) ;
cached Boolean u s e s C e r t i f i c a t e s ( Model mo) :
mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . e x i s t s
( c | c . h a s C e r t i f i c a t e S t e r e o t y p e ( ) ) ;
L i s t [ Class ] g e t C e r t i f i c a t e C l a s s e s ( Model mo) :
mo. getClassDiagramClasses ( ) . s e l e c t
( c | c . h a s C e r t i f i c a t e S t e r e o t y p e ( ) ) ;
Boolean hasMapKey(Type ty ) :
ty . metaType == Class && ( ( Class ) ty ) . hasMapKey ( ) ;
Boolean hasMapKey( Class c ) :
c . ownedAttribute . e x i s t s ( a | a . hasStereotype
(”SecureMDD : : key ” ) ) ;
Property getMapKey (Type ty ) : ( ( Class ) ty ) . getMapKey ( ) ;
Property getMapKey ( Class c ) : c . ownedAttribute . s e l e c t
( a | a . hasStereotype (”SecureMDD : : key ” ) ) . f i r s t ( ) ;
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Chapter 14
Auxiliary Xtend operations for
parsing
import uml ;
Void setContext ( Model m) :
JAVA swt . Parser . setContext
( org . e c l i p s e . uml2 . uml . Model ) ;
Void se tCurrentClas s ( S t r ing c ) :
JAVA swt . Parser . s e tCurrentClas s ( java . lang . S t r ing ) ;
S t r ing getASMAUXSpec ( ) :
JAVA swt . Parser . getASMAUXSpec ( ) ;
S t r ing getASMVariablesDef ( ) :
JAVA swt . Parser . getASMVariablesDef ( ) ;
S t r ing act iv i t i e s2ASM ( ) :
JAVA swt . Parser . act iv i t i e s2ASM ( ) ;
S t r ing getSendRece iveClass ( S t r ing s ) :
JAVA swt . Parser . getSendRece iveClass ( java . lang . S t r ing ) ;
S t r ing ge tPor tSt r ing ( S t r ing SendStr ing ) :
JAVA swt . Parser . getPortOfSendAction ( java . lang . S t r ing ) ;
Boolean s t r i n g L e s s ( S t r ing a , S t r ing b) :
JAVA swt . Parser . s t r i n g L e s s
( java . lang . Str ing , java . lang . S t r ing ) ;
S t r ing MELReceiveAction2ASM ( St r ing c ) :
JAVA swt . Parser . MELReceiveAction2ASM
( java . lang . S t r ing ) ;
S t r ing MELSendSignalAction2ASM
( St r ing sends t r ing , S t r ing port ) :
JAVA swt . Parser . MELSendSignalAction2ASM
( java . lang . Str ing , java . lang . S t r ing ) ;
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St r ing MELAction2ASM( St r ing s ) :
JAVA swt . Parser . MELAction2ASM( java . lang . S t r ing ) ;
S t r ing MELGuard2ASM( St r ing s ) :
JAVA swt . Parser .MELGuard2ASM( java . lang . S t r ing ) ;
Void l ogg ing ( S t r ing s ) :
JAVA swt . Parser . l o gg ing ( java . lang . S t r ing ) ;
Void parseOCL ( Class s ) :
JAVA swt . OCLParser . parse ( org . e c l i p s e . uml2 . uml . Class ) ;
Void p a r s e e i g e n ( Class s ) :
JAVA swt . OCLParser . p a r s e e i g e n
( org . e c l i p s e . uml2 . uml . Class ) ;
S t r ing getOCLConstraints ( S t r ing s t r ) :
JAVA swt . Parser . getOCLConstraints ( java . lang . S t r ing ) ;
Void evaluateOCL ( Class s ) :
JAVA swt . OCLParser . eva luate
( org . e c l i p s e . uml2 . uml . Class ) ;
Void setOCLContext ( Model m) :
JAVA swt . OCLParser . setContext
( org . e c l i p s e . uml2 . uml . Model ) ;
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